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Abstract 
A variety of governmental actors within OECD-DAC donor countries oversee funding 
distributed to developing countries. This paper examines the role of diverse bureaucracies 
within the development policy systems of Germany and the United States and highlights 
core questions that their international engagement presents for the future of development 
cooperation. The paper reviews trends in funding across bureaucracies over the last 
decade, provides an overview of existing mechanisms for enhancing cross-governmental 
consistency and analyses proposals to reform the organisational set-up of the two systems. 
Although the challenges presented by sector-specific bureaucracies vary across donor 
contexts and within particular sectors of engagement, their presence in the cooperation 
landscape clearly creates pressure on foreign affairs and development bureaucracies to 
redefine their roles in the management of international cooperation. In preparing for future 
challenges, these bureaucratic actors will need to clearly articulate their own geographical, 
thematic and coordination competences in order to determine how the expertise and other 
resources from varied governmental actors can be effectively combined.  
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Executive summary 
The internationalisation of the work of sector-specific ministries within donor countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC) is one example of how the field of actors engaging in development 
cooperation is diversifying. This paper examines the role of varied bureaucracies as 
development cooperation actors within the German and US systems and identifies challenges 
that their engagement presents for the future of development cooperation. 
A broad review of trends in the provision of official development assistance (ODA) in both 
donor systems indicates that, although a wide variety of bureaucratic actors oversee resources 
directed to developing countries, these entities individually account for a small share of aid 
flows in comparison to the foreign affairs and development agencies that remain at the core of 
both systems. 
These core governmental actors have seemingly consolidated their leading positions in 
international cooperation in Germany and the United States over the last decade. Funding 
tendencies across governmental entities nevertheless reveal shifts in each system. In 
Germany, where project funding from ministries such as the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
or the Ministry of Education and Research hints at the fragmented character of small-scale 
initiatives tapping into domestic expertise, the expansion of ODA funding mobilised through 
the Ministry for the Environment indicates the importance of climate change as an issue area 
requiring increased inter-ministerial collaboration. In the United States, the Department of 
Health and Human Services has notably expanded its global profile, underlining the potential 
for significant coordination challenges with respect to US global health investments – a core 
priority in the US system. 
The phenomenon of bureaucratic pluralism draws attention to long-standing issues 
concerning the role definition of the governmental actors at the heart of cooperation systems. 
In Germany, for example, the engagement of diverse ministries in cooperation with emerging 
economies highlights the potential for the Federal Foreign Office to assume a more important 
role in coordinating the activities of varied ministries. This raises questions about the future 
role of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in shaping 
country-level coordination and influencing cross-governmental priorities. In the US context, 
sectoral contributions from across US government agencies similarly draw attention to the 
State Department’s capabilities to guide cooperation in diverse thematic areas and to the 
future mandate of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in a 
context where other governmental entities hold expertise relevant for international 
cooperation. 
Numerous coordination mechanisms exist in both systems to promote consistency across 
governmental entities working internationally. In Germany, the promotion of cross-
governmental coherence in engagement with developing countries is nevertheless constrained 
by the principle of departmental independence, the lack of overarching hierarchical 
coordination mechanisms within the German government and the overlapping geographical 
mandates of the Foreign Office and the BMZ. The lack of a clear legislative framework for 
engagement with developing countries and the limitations of hierarchical coordination 
mechanisms within the executive branch pose challenges for improving coherence in the US 
system. Although the US State Department is a central player in overseeing international 
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cooperation throughout the US system due to its substantial funding oversight and 
hierarchical advantage over USAID with respect to strategy formulation and budgeting, in 
practice there are also limitations in its ability to assert a cross-governmental coordination 
role at the headquarters level and in the field, in part due to the advantages in expertise that 
sector-specific actors maintain. 
To address concerns about the current and future functionality of international cooperation 
systems, analysts interested in the more effective promotion of global development goals 
have advanced numerous organisational reform proposals. In the German context, key reform 
alternatives have included strengthening the coordination or functional mandates of an 
independent global development ministry, integrating the BMZ into the Foreign Office or 
strengthening the mandate of sector-specific ministries within the cooperation system. In the 
United States, core reform proposals have included fundamentally revising the legislative and 
strategic framework for international funding, elevating the position of the core development 
agency within the system, integrating USAID into the State Department, promoting 
significant organisational reforms within the State Department to strengthen its development 
orientation or consolidating programmes pursuing similar aims across the government on the 
basis of a comprehensive review of international affairs funding. 
The organisational reform proposals outlined in this paper highlight core areas for reflection 
on the optimal organisation of international cooperation in the future. Policy-makers should 
first assess the need for adaptation within international cooperation systems in relation to the 
goals or strategic framework guiding cooperation. In adapting the organisation of cooperation, 
the competencies that diverse governmental actors can contribute towards achieving these 
goals, the coordination mechanisms needed to maintain a useful division of labour among 
governmental actors, and the resource requirements for bureaucracies to fulfil the functional 
and coordination mandates they are attributed should all be taken into consideration. 
Ongoing debates on the future of foreign policy and on the content of a post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda provide an opportunity to define the range of governmental 
competencies needed to address future international cooperation challenges and to clarify the 
roles of different governmental actors in addressing elements of the foreign and development 
policy goal system. Development agencies should therefore be prepared to position 
themselves in discussions on the adaptation of cooperation systems, and internal competence 
assessments should provide a basis for this. The purpose of such assessments should be to 
identify the geographical, thematic, cross-sectoral and coordination competencies that reflect 
the accumulated expertise and unique value-added of these organisations within the broader 
external relations apparatus. However, a substantive assessment of the comparative 
advantages of various ministries in engaging in developing countries cannot be limited to a 
self-presentation of strengths of development agencies, given the potential advantages of 
other governmental entities with respect to sectoral expertise, access to diverse networks or 
their recourse to alternative business practices and implementation models. 
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1 Bureaucratic pluralism in global development: Challenges for Germany 
and the United States 
The multidimensional character of global development has long created overlaps between 
development cooperation as a policy field and other elements of the external relations of 
OECD-DAC donor countries. Efforts to promote environmental sustainability, the 
stabilisation of post-conflict states and trade expansion highlight that the goal of reducing 
global poverty is intertwined with a variety of other objectives, and that the response to 
these challenges requires contributions from a multitude of public and private actors, 
including a diverse spectrum of governmental entities in OECD-DAC countries. Such 
contributions can include changes in international and domestic regulatory frameworks and 
the provision of financial, technical, and/or humanitarian assistance to support development 
efforts in partner countries. 
Numerous analyses characterise development policy as a field currently experiencing 
fundamental adaptation pressures. The policy field’s shifting sands are considered to be a 
result not only of the changes in the country contexts where cooperation takes place but also 
the proliferation of goals of cooperation, the diversification of the actors engaging in 
cooperation and the multiplication of instruments used (Severino / Ray 2009; Janus / 
Klingebiel / Paulo 2013; Gore 2013). These trends have potential benefits such as expanding 
choices for partner countries and encouraging innovation, but they also imply a basic 
coordination challenge in ensuring that pluralism does not lead to the inefficient splintering of 
cooperation efforts (Davies 2011; Severino / Ray 2010; Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013). 
This paper discusses the opportunities and challenges that the involvement of diverse 
governmental actors as aid providers in developing countries presents for the future of 
development cooperation. As noted in a previous paper on this topic (Lundsgaarde 2013a), 
governmental entities beyond the aid and foreign affairs ministries at the core of many 
OECD-DAC development cooperation systems can potentially enhance cooperation efforts 
by mobilising expertise or expanding networks for development. Viewed more sceptically, 
the international engagement of sector-specific ministries may also contribute to the 
proliferation of development initiatives and add to the coherence challenges of policy 
systems that are already facing difficulties in implementing aid-effectiveness principles. 
This analysis examines the issue of bureaucratic pluralism in development cooperation with 
reference to Germany and the United States, both of which are leading OECD-DAC 
bilateral donors. In 2011, the US$ 27.1 billion in ODA disbursements from the United 
States alone accounted for some 29 per cent of all ODA from DAC member countries, while 
Germany’s ODA effort (US$ 8.74 billion) represented more than 9 per cent of total DAC 
ODA (OECD 2013). The analysis of these cases seeks to identify key issues that the 
involvement of diverse ministries presents for the management of engagement with 
developing countries. The paper does not attempt an evaluation of the effectiveness of 
ministerial development contributions, but rather aims to guide reflections on the future of 
the organisation of international cooperation in Germany and the United States, recognising 
that many issues arising from the analysis will be relevant for other OECD-DAC donors as 
well as aid providers beyond the DAC. 
Analyses of the contributions of Germany and the United States to aid fragmentation have 
reached different conclusions, depending on the evaluation criteria on which the 
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assessments are based. According to an OECD analysis, Germany and the United States 
contribute less than most other DAC donors to the cross-country fragmentation of aid, 
which is characterised by the distribution of relatively small amounts of aid across many 
countries (OECD 2012). This can be explained in part by the large size of their overall aid 
portfolios. Due to their size, however, both donors also generally engage in a comparatively 
high number of sectors within their partner countries and therefore increase in-country aid 
fragmentation (Bürcky 2011). In the Quality of Official Development Assistance 
assessment, Birdsall and Kharas (2010) adopt fragmentation of aid among ministries from a 
single donor country as an indicator of donor efforts to reduce the administrative burden on 
partner countries and improve aid quality. Among the 30 donors for which standardised 
fragmentation scores are reported, Germany was considered more fragmented than 18. The 
United States appeared towards the bottom of this list, with Spain, Greece and the United 
Nations system achieving equivalent or lower standardised scores. Although the inclusion of 
individual UN agencies on the list may distort these standardised scores, the ranking 
nevertheless suggests that Germany and the United States are among the more fragmented 
bilateral donors within the DAC. 
To assess the implications of bureaucratic pluralism for the future of development 
cooperation, this paper begins by providing an overview of funding trends related to the 
international engagement of sector-specific ministries in both donor countries, describing 
the profile of varied bureaucracies as ODA providers. The second chapter examines the 
issue of intra-governmental coordination in development cooperation, providing an 
overview of existing practices to promote cooperation across ministerial lines. The third 
chapter reviews proposals to reform the two development cooperation systems to enhance 
intra-governmental cooperation. The final chapter summarises the key issues that the 
analysis raises for policy discussions on how to promote governmental coherence in 
international cooperation. 
The study is primarily a desk-based analysis that draws on government documents and 
policy analysis available in the public domain. Background interviews with a limited 
number of informants in Washington, DC, and in Germany also provided input for the 
analysis, in particular by offering insights on the character of ministerial engagement in 
developing countries and on the current state of cooperation among internationally active 
government agencies. 
The study’s point of departure is the examination of the role of diverse ministries in ODA 
provision and the development policy field, with which it is closely associated. ODA is 
primarily a reporting concept that captures concessional resource flows from governmental 
actors to developing countries, though some qualifying ODA contributions such as support 
for refugees do not constitute a cross-border resource transfer (OECD 2008b).
1
 The focus on 
                                                          
1  The ODA concept is an imperfect way of summarising resource flows to developing countries. To 
better capture the volume of resource transfers that partner countries can influence, the OECD-DAC 
has developed the concept of country programmable aid (CPA), which excludes ODA-eligible funding 
such as humanitarian assistance, debt relief, administration costs and spending on development 
research and education in donor countries (Benn / Rogerson / Steensen 2010). In select cases, the 
volume of a donor’s CPA excludes aid provided by ministries apart from the main development 
agency. Disaggregated data on volumes of CPA in Germany and the United States by government 
agency are not available through the OECD’s CPA database. 
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ODA provision likely underplays the global role of certain ministries, given their 
importance in shaping international regulatory frameworks. It also neglects the international 
funding role of governmental actors that support firms active in developing countries, for 
example in the form of export credits. Although all or part of their funding for cooperation 
programmes in developing countries may qualify as ODA, ministries with core 
competencies in domestic public policy fields may be reluctant to consider themselves as 
development cooperation actors, given that development cooperation is associated with a 
goal system and criteria for assessing effectiveness that sector-specific ministries do not 
necessarily share. Nevertheless, the ODA focus is considered relevant in this analysis 
because it provides a basis for the comparison of engagement in developing-country 
contexts, both among governmental actors and across donor countries.  
2 Funding trends and international priorities of sector-specific ministries 
This section contextualises the role of sector-specific ministries in the German and US ODA 
systems by outlining general trends in ODA provision in the two countries and tracing the 
distribution of ODA funding across governmental agencies over time. Following a period of 
aid stagnancy in the 1990s, ODA levels increased across the OECD-DAC community. Both 
Germany and the United States contributed to this global trend. In Germany, ODA 
disbursements increased 165 per cent in real terms between 2000 and 2012, reaching nearly 
US$ 14 billion by the end of this period. The United States registered a 235 per cent increase 
in the same period, moving from US$ 12.7 billion to US$ 29.9 billion (OECD 2013). 
Although the increasing availability of ODA funding by itself might be considered a source 
of actor proliferation in ODA management, available data on the distribution of ODA 
funding across ministries suggests that ODA systems in Germany and the United States 
have become more consolidated over time, as the predominance of foreign affairs and 
development agencies in international cooperation has been reinforced. ODA funding trends 
across ministries in the two countries are reviewed below.  
2.1 Funding trends in German ODA 
The general profile of German development cooperation has remained relatively stable over 
the last decade. In 2002, 125 countries received net ODA transfers from Germany; in 2011 
132 countries were net ODA recipients (OECD 2013). In response to recommendations 
from the OECD-DAC encouraging a greater concentration in aid allocation, the BMZ has 
reduced its number of priority partner countries in recent years. By 2013, there were 50 
countries with German bilateral cooperation programmes, compared to 57 at the time of the 
last DAC peer review (OECD 2010). The BMZ identifies another 29 countries as partners 
benefiting from thematically or regionally focused cooperation.
2
 Sub-Saharan Africa 
contains the largest number of priority countries and attracted the largest share of German 
ODA for most years between 2002 and 2011, accounting for an average of 26 per cent of 
German aid in this period.
3
 The average shares of aid flowing to East Asia (12 per cent), 
                                                          
2  See http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/laenderliste/index.html. 
3  The exceptions were 2007, when large aid allocations to Iraq made the Middle East the leading region 
for German ODA, and 2010, when South and Central Asia received a larger ODA share. 
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South and Central Asia (12 per cent), the Americas (11 per cent) and the Middle East (11 
per cent) suggest that the German ODA budget is evenly distributed around the globe. 
Nevertheless, a shift in funding towards South and Central Asia is one discernible change in 
German ODA funding patterns since 2009, with funding for Afghanistan and India 
experiencing noticeable increases. 
German ODA funding has long been perceived to have a bias towards middle-income 
countries. Between 2002 and 2011, the share of German aid directed to lower-middle-
income countries (LMICs) and upper-middle-income countries (UMICs) exceeded the DAC 
average, reflecting a priority in engaging with regional economic powers as well as a heavy 
allocation of ODA towards debt cancellation in LMICs in the middle of the decade (OECD 
2010). Apart from debt cancellation, investments in social infrastructure and services as well 
as economic infrastructure and production were the most important areas of sectoral 
specialisation in the German ODA programme in this period (OECD 2013). 
Table 1 provides a summary of the evolution of ODA allocations through diverse govern-
mental channels from 2004 to 2011. The annual summary tables prepared by the BMZ that 
are the basis for the information presented in this table list between 19 and 22 different 
governmental sources of ODA funding in these years, including all current German 
ministries, the German parliament and the federal states, for which funding is reported 
collectively.
4
 Throughout the period, the BMZ and the Foreign Office were the ministries 
directly responsible for the largest shares of German ODA. The BMZ tables indicate that all 
German ministries provide funding that is classified as ODA. For the most part, the volume 
of funding from sector-specific ministries is nevertheless quite small. In 2011, for example, 
ODA funding channelled through sector-specific ministries ranged from EUR 200,000 for 
the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS) to EUR 
187.6 million for the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety (BMU).
5
 
The large ODA sums directed towards debt cancellation between 2005 and 2008 may 
contribute to a distorted picture of the distribution of ODA resources across German 
ministries over time. Debt forgiveness and rescheduling are captured in the line in table 1 
referring to “federal assets”, which are not attributed to a single ministry. The absence of 
attribution leads to an underassessment of the importance of both the Federal Ministry of 
Finance (BMF), which oversees the implementation of debt cancellation instruments, and 
the BMZ, which shares decision-making authority with other ministries related to these 
instruments. A similar story holds for the ODA funding that is a part of Germany’s 
contribution to the budget of the European Union (EU). While the Ministry of Finance 
manages this budgetary assessment, the BMZ acts as the lead ministry in influencing  
EU-level discussions on programming development instruments. Although both lines in the  
                                                          
4  The governmental entities for which data is reported include the following ministries, for which 
English translations are provided in the list of abbreviations: AA, BMZ, BMU, BMBF, BMF, BMELV, 
BMG, BMWi, BMAS, BMI, BMVg, BMJ, BMFSFJ and BMVBS. Funding for the Bundesministerium 
für Wirtschaft und Arbeit was reported prior to the ministry’s division into the BMWi and BMAS in 
2005. In addition, the statistical tables make note of allocations to the Federal Government 
Commissioner for Culture and the Media (BKM), the German Bundestag and the Deutsche 
Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG). 
5  Following the formation of the new government in December 2013, the BMU was renamed the Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB). 
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Table 1: German ODA by governmental entities, 2004–2011 (in million EUR (% of total)) 
Agency 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
BMZ 
4321.2 
(59.9) 
3632.2 
(38.9) 
4412.2 
(46) 
5119.2 
(51.2) 
5549.8 
(50.1) 
6065.1 
(63.3) 
7017.4 
(64.6) 
7319.9 
(65.2) 
Foreign 
Office 
233 
(3.2) 
278.5 
(3) 
345.3 
(3.6) 
359.9 
(3.6) 
636.1 
(5.7) 
782.2 
(8.2) 
854.5 
(7.9) 
792 
(7.1) 
EU budget 
967.3 
(13.4) 
1156.9 
(12.4) 
1087.8 
(11.3) 
1122.1 
(11.2) 
1201.9 
(10.9) 
1271.3 
(13.3) 
1335.5 
(12.3) 
1244.5 
(11.1) 
Federal 
assets 
673.1 
(9.3) 
3175.6 
(34) 
2417 
(25.2) 
2187 
(21.9) 
2280.7 
(20.6) 
103.3 
(1.1) 
163.3 
(1.5) 
326.3 
(2.9) 
Federal 
states 
660.3 
(9.2) 
782.8 
(8.4) 
764.2 
(8) 
745.7 
(7.5) 
688.3 
(6.2) 
703.7 
(7.3) 
713 
(6.6) 
703.3 
(6.3) 
BMU 
15 
(.2) 
16.2 
(.2) 
17.4 
(.2) 
15.6 
(.2) 
82 
(.7) 
160.9 
(1.7) 
155.5 
(1.4) 
187.6 
(1.7) 
DEG 
    364.6 
(3.3) 
202.6 
(2.1) 
307.4 
(2.8) 
306.2 
(2.7) 
Other 
339.9 
(4.7) 
287.1 
(3.1) 
555.5 
(5.8) 
448.6 
(4.9) 
262.4 
(2.4) 
292.1 
(3) 
314.9 
(3.2) 
339.1 
(3) 
Total 7209.5 9329.3 9599.4 9998.1 11065.8 9581.2 10861.5 11218.9 
ODA total 6064.3 8112.1 8313.4 8978.4 9328.2 8674.1 9803.9 10135.6 
Herfindahl .396 .306 .296 .330 .314 .431 .444 .449 
Notes: The sum of lines from governmental entities exceeds the ODA total because this table does not list return payments to the 
federal budget – a negative figure that cannot be attributed to a single ministry. The share of ODA by ministry was calculated on the 
basis of the sum of all budget lines, with the exception of return payments to the federal budget. The figures for the BMZ include 
resources attributed directly to the ministry as well as market instruments (Marktmittel) disbursed via the KfW Development Bank 
and overseen primarily by the BMZ. This table follows the BMZ in listing the DEG (an organisation that extends financing to 
support private investment and private sector development) as an ODA provider. The DEG is a subsidiary of the KfW Development 
Bank, which, like the Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), is not listed separately in the summary tables due to its 
role in implementing the assistance already attributed to other governmental entities. This table does not report funding from 
governmental entities that accounted for less than 1 per cent of German ODA in all of the years examined. 
Sources: Author’s own compilation based on BMZ (2005; 2007; 2008a; 2010; 2011; 2012) 
table reflect areas of inter-ministerial cooperation, they also underline that decision-making 
authority in the German ODA arena is primarily vested in three core ministries: the BMZ, 
the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Finance. 
In addition to underestimating the role of the core federal ministries in overseeing ODA 
flows, this table likely overstates the importance of the federal states within the German 
development cooperation system. There are 16 federal states, which autonomously 
determine priorities for development funding. Because the largest share of this funding 
relates to the cost of hosting students from developing countries and other domestic funding 
such as support for development education work or development-oriented research, it does 
not pose a serious coordination challenge within the broader development cooperation 
system. Nevertheless, the small remainder of sub-national ODA funding is generally widely 
dispersed to a variety of projects around the world (Wiemann 2008). 
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Even though the BMZ accounts for a large share of the German ODA marketplace on its 
own, it has not been alone in contributing to the overall ODA increases over the last decade. 
The most significant increase in development-related funding from a line ministry in the 
period summarised in Table 1 came from the Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety. In 2011, however, BMU-funded development work 
accounted for less than 2 per cent of German ODA allocations. The recent rise in 
international BMU funding stems from the International Climate Initiative, created in 2008 
to promote climate mitigation and adaptation efforts as well as biodiversity protection. The 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions has, to date, been its most important funding 
priority, and the initiative has funded 347 projects in 80 partner countries.
6
 
There is variation across other ministries in the nature of funding increases over time. The 
volume of ODA funding flowing through the Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF) has noticeably increased, whereas funding distributed through the Federal Ministry 
of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMELV) and the Federal Ministry of Health 
(BMG) has been stable. ODA attributed to the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) declined 
markedly from a high of EUR 26 million in 2006 to less than 4 million in 2011. Although the 
financial footprints of these sector-specific ministries in developing countries remain relatively 
small, their influence extends beyond funding issues to include shaping policy frameworks for 
engaging in areas linked to their sectoral mandates. Examples include the leading role of the 
BMG in formulating the German government’s Strategy for Global Health Policy (German 
Federal Government 2013) and the contribution of the BMVg in developing governmental 
guidelines for engagement in fragile states (AA / BMVg / BMZ 2012). 
The project orientation in the BMU’s international portfolio is typical of governmental 
actors that disburse comparatively small sums of funding to developing countries. In 
addition to funding measures such as bilateral technical assistance related to their core areas 
of competence, numerous line ministries also have responsibilities in managing German 
contributions to international organisations. For example, the BMELV oversees German 
contributions to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, whereas the BMG 
oversees contributions to the World Health Organization (Schorlemmer 2009).
7
 
There is variation across line ministries with respect to the importance of bilateral versus 
multilateral ODA funding in their international cooperation programmes. The BMBF’s 
cooperation with developing countries takes place almost exclusively through bilateral 
channels, whereas the BMG’s ODA funding is almost exclusively multilateral (BMZ 2012). 
This implies that different aspects of inter-ministerial coordination are important depending 
on the sector and the governmental actors represented in a given arena. Assessing the level 
of organisational coherence in managing relations with developing countries is relevant both 
with reference to bilateral development cooperation – where the consistency of programmes 
and projects funded by the German government in partner countries should be a key concern 
– and in the context of multilateral development cooperation, where the effectiveness of 
coordination in the oversight of international organisations should be scrutinised. 
                                                          
6  See http://www.international-climate-initiative.com/en/about-the-iki/.  
7  As a result of the change of government at the end of 2013, the consumer protection mandate of the 
BMELV was transferred to the Ministry of Justice. The ministry’s name was therefore shortened to 
Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL). 
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Even though selected line ministries have expanded international programmes, the degree of 
fragmentation in the German aid system related to the dispersion of funding responsibilities 
across ministerial lines has declined over time. The Herfindahl Index reported in Table 1 
provides a basic measure of the level of bureaucratic consolidation in the German 
development cooperation system.
8
 Although this measure of the concentration of ministerial 
control may be distorted due to specificities related to funding for the EU budget and debt 
cancellation outlined above, the index reflects the increasing share of ODA directly 
controlled by the BMZ and the Foreign Office. 
A large number of countries receive some funding from sector-specific ministries. In the 
context of the International Climate Initiative, Asia and Latin America are the leading 
regions attracting funding from the BMU. China is the country where the largest number of 
projects has been funded through this initiative (27). Within Asia, India, Indonesia, Thailand 
and Vietnam follow in importance. Brazil is a key partner country in Latin America, while 
South Africa is the most important African partner for the BMU. Cooperation with middle-
income countries is similarly important for the BMBF, given that cooperation programmes 
build on an existing research infrastructure. In the German government’s 2008 strategy for 
internationalising science and research, China, India and Brazil are explicitly mentioned as 
countries of special interest beyond Europe (BMBF 2008). Other key non-OECD partner 
countries for BMBF funding include Indonesia, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan.
9
 This support generally assists German 
research institutions in expanding their networks and engaging in pilot research projects. As 
the BMBF example illustrates, sector-specific cooperation with emerging economies reflects 
a shift towards interest-based horizontal engagement, where partners acknowledge the 
mutual benefits of cooperation. 
In contrast to the BMU and the BMBF, the bilateral cooperation profile of the BMELV has, 
to date, had a more narrow geographical scope. Its technical assistance projects to support 
nutrition, agricultural development and consumer protection goals are considered an 
extension of post–Cold War projects to promote agricultural development in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Its comparatively small international 
cooperation portfolio continues to be concentrated in this region, with Russia and the 
Ukraine alone accounting for 61.8 per cent of project funding between 2008 and 2011.
10
 
Projects in China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Brazil and Belarus accounted for much of the 
remainder. 
                                                          
8  The Herfindahl Index is typically used to measure the degree of competition or concentration in a 
market. The measure consists of the sum of the squared market share of the organisations that are 
identified in the marketplace. In this case, the index refers to the sum of squares of the share of ODA 
attributed to 22 entries in the BMZ summary tables on the origins of ODA funding. Two of the entry 
lines are collective entries, reflecting the combined sums of funding from the German federal states as 
well as a remainder category for funders that are not listed individually. The calculations presented 
here also consider the German contribution to the EU budget and measures related to debt relief 
labelled under “federal assets” as separate entities within the ODA marketplace, reflecting the different 
decision-making logics with which they are associated. 
9  For more information about the international support provided by the BMBF, please see  
http://www.internationales-buero.de/de/785.php. 
10  Russia does not qualify as an ODA recipient.  
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The BMZ and the Foreign Office remain the two most important ministries in the German 
system, due to the financial resources for cooperation with developing countries that they 
oversee and their mandates to promote coordination among other ministries. The exploration 
of ODA trends above indicates that the centrality of these ministries in international 
cooperation has been reinforced even as some sector-specific ministries have expanded their 
international engagement. The study of diverse ministries as aid providers therefore draws 
attention back to these focal points and emphasises that a core challenge in the organisation 
of development cooperation relates to the balance of responsibilities between the BMZ and 
the Foreign Office. 
The increasing financial and political role of the Foreign Office in the ODA system in recent 
years has several sources. The ministry has consolidated its position as a humanitarian aid 
provider, integrating instruments related to short-term crisis response and transitional 
assistance in its portfolio (AA / BMZ 2012). To foster democratisation and conflict resolution 
efforts, the Foreign Office extends funding to multilateral organisations and non-governmental 
organisations to support projects aimed at strengthening the rule of law, addressing gender-
related challenges in peace-building and post-conflict rehabilitation.
11
 It also oversees funding 
related to cultural cooperation, including support for the Goethe-Institut in developing 
countries. Beyond funding, another reason for the Foreign Office’s rising importance in 
international cooperation relates to the prominence of emerging economies in German 
strategies for global engagement. Although some large countries, including China, India, 
Brazil, South Africa and Mexico, still qualify as ODA recipients, a diversified German 
cooperation portfolio reflects not only Germany’s economic interests but also its goal to 
influence the way that these “shaping powers” (Gestaltungsmächte) contribute to the 
resolution of global governance challenges (German Federal Government 2012). 
The priority attached to engagement with the “shaping powers” beyond development 
cooperation is leading to an adjustment of the roles of governmental entities in bilateral 
cooperation. These partner countries in many cases remain BMZ priority countries. Thus, 
wider governmental engagement vis-à-vis these countries can be understood as a 
progression of existing emphases within the development cooperation system rather than as 
a fundamental reorientation in foreign policy. German cooperation with China provides an 
example of this adjustment process. In 2010, the BMZ initiated a phasing-out of its 
cooperation portfolio with China via its decision to discontinue bilateral technical and 
financial assistance to the country. Although the BMZ has indicated that it will continue to 
engage in dialogue with China through a strategic development cooperation partnership, the 
drawing-down of BMZ-guided funding diminishes its role in Germany-China relations.
12
 
At the same time that development cooperation managed by the BMZ in China is coming to 
a close, sector-specific ministries are increasing their funding for cooperation with China. 
These investments may be guided by a set of priorities similar to core areas of engagement 
for development cooperation (promotion of peace and security; human rights and rule of 
law; economic development; energy and sustainability; among other goals). In addition, the 
                                                          
11  Information on support provided by the Foreign Office for crisis prevention and conflict resolution 
issues is available on the following website: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/ 
HumanitaereHilfe/AktuelleArtikel/130110_Leitfaden_AA_BMZ_erklaerung.html. 
12  The BMZ’s description of the nature of its cooperation with China can be found at: http://www.bmz.de/ 
de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/asien/china/index.html. 
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availability of new forms of financing does not necessarily mean that implementation 
channels have changed, as, in practice, the large German implementing organisations in 
development cooperation (GIZ and KfW) sustain their engagement in familiar country 
contexts through partnerships with ministries beyond the BMZ (Binding / Kudlimay 2013). 
As a diverse set of ministries whose cooperation programmes follow a clear interest-based 
logic increase their cooperation with emerging economies, the Foreign Office has an 
opportunity to assume a more important role in orchestrating these ministerial activities, 
given its role in representing German interests abroad. 
As noted above, defining the respective roles of the Foreign Office and the BMZ in 
managing cooperation remains a core issue in analysing broader changes in the ministerial 
landscape of engagement with developing countries, due to their central financial and 
political positions within the German ODA system. As the evaluation of Germany’s 
commitment to the implementation of the Paris Declaration indicated, lines of ministerial 
responsibility in managing relations with specific development countries have, in the past, 
been blurred because development cooperation programmes require the assent of the 
Foreign Office, even though the BMZ is considered the lead ministry in negotiating 
cooperation agreements with partner countries and funding for cooperation is primarily 
allocated through the BMZ (2008b).
13
 The ambiguity in the division of labour between the 
Foreign Office and the BMZ in managing development cooperation efforts at the country 
level has been reinforced by the limited field presence of the BMZ itself and the integration 
of BMZ representatives into the Foreign Service, creating a direct reporting line to the 
Foreign Office through the embassy. To enhance its direct participation in development 
cooperation management in the field, the BMZ committed to increasing its personnel 
assigned to embassies in partner countries in 2013 (BMZ 2013).
14
 
In summary, the fragmentation of the German development cooperation system – linked to 
the small sums disbursed by federal states and line ministries – occurs around the edges of a 
relatively consolidated system, with the BMZ at its centre. The overview of funding trends 
                                                          
13  The role of the Foreign Office in offering its consent for funding proposals for specific countries relates 
to the principle of examining the consistency of proposals from other ministries with German foreign 
policy objectives. This principle (in German: Prüfung der außenpolitischen Unbedenklichkeit) has a 
passive connotation, as the Foreign Office examines the innocuousness or non-objectability of funding 
proposals with respect to foreign policy. The Foreign Office’s formal role in approving country-level 
funding nevertheless indicates its pre-eminence in foreign affairs compared to other ministries. An 
evaluation of German humanitarian assistance noted, for example, that whereas the BMZ was required 
to consult with the Foreign Office before approving and disbursing funding in this area, the Foreign 
Office was not subject to a comparable requirement vis-à-vis the BMZ. Ministries are expected to share 
information on country-level funding decisions across ministerial lines, even if decisions are made 
independently (BMZ / AA 2011). 
14  The limited field presence of the BMZ is related to the important role that parastatal implementing 
organisations play in German development cooperation. The implementing organisations have more 
personnel working both at headquarters and in the field than the BMZ. According to figures reported in 
the last DAC Peer Review of Germany, in 2009 the BMZ had 623 headquarters-based staff and 60 staff 
in the field. The KfW Development Bank counted 818 headquarters staff and 78 field staff in the same 
year. The three technical assistance organisations (GTZ, DED and InWent) that later merged to form 
the GIZ had a combined total of 2,785 headquarters staff and 2,514 staff in the field. In addition, the 
implementing organisations together employed 10,455 local staff, the vast majority of which were local 
hires of the GTZ (OECD 2010). The recent increases in BMZ personnel assigned to country missions 
have not fundamentally altered this balance. 
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above confirms Schorlemmer’s (2009) analysis of aid distributed among German 
governmental entities from 1995 to 2007, which noted that the BMZ’s pivotal role within 
the German development cooperation system had not yet been fundamentally challenged by 
the international engagement of various ministries. Whether or not the management of 
German development cooperation itself is challenged by the engagement of a variety of 
governmental entities at the margins of the system, the multiplicity of ODA funding sources 
within a single donor country may still compound fragmentation at the partner-country 
level, which creates inefficiencies related to the duplication of analytical work and a higher 
administrative burden for donor and partner countries alike. 
While the growing international role of sector-specific ministries is far from displacing the 
privileged position of the BMZ in funding international cooperation in the German system, 
the changes taking place on the system’s margins raise questions about the comparative 
advantages of the BMZ as a cooperation actor in relation to other governmental actors. 
Perceived advantages of the BMZ include its ability to adopt a cross-sectoral perspective to 
confront multidimensional development challenges and its responsiveness to the interests of 
partner countries in formulating policy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some country 
contexts, partner-country governments or individual ministries within them may themselves 
seek sector-specific rather than cross-sectoral cooperation. This suggests that the assessment 
of comparative advantage should take multiple dimensions of organisational value into 
consideration, as the functionality of an organisation can be evaluated in relation to both the 
German government’s goals and the preferences that partner countries express in 
cooperation relationships. 
2.2 Funding trends in the United States 
As the world’s largest bilateral aid provider, the United States has a global presence in 
development cooperation. In 2002, a total of 122 countries and territories were net US 
ODA recipients; in 2011, there were 133 countries that held this distinction. Although the 
Obama administration has promoted greater selectivity in aid allocation – implying the 
extension of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) allocation logic to the broader 
funding landscape – the US continues to provide significant development funding in 
varied country contexts across world regions (OECD 2011). In line with historical trends, 
funding priorities have followed key national security interests in the last decade. Nearly 
19 per cent of US aid was directed towards the Middle East between 2002 and 2011, with 
the share of US aid to the region being especially high in the years immediately following 
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Afghanistan and Pakistan have also been major ODA 
recipients in recent years, and aid to South and Central Asia averaged 16 per cent of the 
US total between 2002 and 2011. In the same period, ODA to sub-Saharan Africa 
expanded in volume and as a share of the overall aid budget, accounting for 25 per cent of 
US ODA on average, making the continent the most important region for US development 
cooperation (OECD 2013). 
General tendencies concerning the distribution of US ODA across income groups are 
consistent with DAC averages. LMICs received the largest share of US aid on average 
between 2002 and 2011 (33 per cent), though the share of aid to the least-developed 
countries has surpassed aid to LMICs since 2008 and represented 38 per cent of the  
US aid total in 2011. The sectoral profile of US assistance is weighted towards social infra- 
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Table 2: US ODA commitments by government agency, 2005–2011 (in million US$ (% of total)) 
Agency 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
USDA 
4,138 
(13.7) 
554 
(2.1) 
277 
(1) 
376 
(1.1) 
339 
(1) 
451 
(1.2) 
330 
(1) 
DOD 
5,500 
(18.3) 
3,932 
(14.7) 
2,331 
(8.4) 
2,626 
(7.6) 
1,431 
(4.4) 
1,448 
(3.9) 
856 
(2.6) 
HHS 
1,618 
(5.4) 
1,863 
(7) 
2,685 
(9.7) 
3,704 
(10.7) 
3,113 
(9.5) 
3,281 
(8.8) 
4,240 
(12.7) 
State 
4,374 
(14.5) 
4,218 
(15.8) 
4,438 
(16.1) 
5,325 
(15.4) 
6,406 
(19.5) 
6,434 
(17.3) 
6,143 
(18.3) 
Treasury 
1,188 
(3.9) 
1,183 
(4.4) 
1,473 
(5.3) 
1,306 
(3.8) 
1,646 
(5) 
2,247 
(6.1) 
2,002 
(6) 
MCC 
517 
(1.7) 
1,437 
(5.4) 
1,837 
(6.6) 
3,775 
(10.9) 
1,496 
(4.5) 
1,543 
(4.2) 
1,059 
(3.2) 
USAID 
11,714 
(38.9) 
11,047 
(41.4) 
13,509 
(48.9) 
16,408 
(47.3) 
17,316 
(52.6) 
20,393 
(55) 
17,034 
(51) 
Other 
1,061 
(3.5) 
2,444 
(9.2) 
1,088 
(3.9) 
1,158 
(3.3) 
1,149 
(3.5) 
1,330 
(3.6) 
1,832 
(5.5) 
Total 30,109 26,678 27,639 34,678 32,897 37,126 33,496 
Herfindahl .230 .232 .289 .278 .331 .347 .315 
Figures on the top line of each row are in US$ millions. The numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of total US ODA 
allocated to each agency. The “other” category includes the following agencies, for which ODA figures were reported in the given 
years: Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of 
Labour, Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation, African Development Foundation, Inter-American Foundation, 
Peace Corps, Trade and Development Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Export-Import (EX-IM) Bank, National Science 
Foundation, the Open World Leadership Center Trust Fund, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, US Institute for Peace and 
the Federal Trade Commission. Among these agencies, only the Department of Energy (DOE), the EX-IM Bank and the Peace 
Corps individually accounted for more than 1 per cent of ODA during any of these years. The Herfindahl ODA concentration 
measure indicates the sum of squares of the market shares of all agencies for which funding was reported in a given year. 
Sources: Author’s own compilation based on (USAID 2013a) 
structure and services (43 per cent on average from 2002 to 2011), and the United States is 
also a significant humanitarian assistance provider in comparison to many other bilateral 
donors (15 per cent of ODA from 2002 to 2011) (OECD 2013). 
A variety of governmental actors are involved in US ODA administration.
15
 The last 
OECD-DAC Peer Review of the United States indicated that 27 public entities had a role 
in aid administration (OECD 2011).
16
 This number includes entities whose ODA-related  
                                                          
15  The concept of ODA is used in the United States to summarise funding flows reported to the OECD-
DAC, but is not a guiding concept in budgetary allocations. The broader label of “foreign assistance”, 
which also encompasses export promotion support, is more commonly used within the US 
development policy system. 
16  The Washington, DC-based think tank the Center for Global Development lists 22 US government 
departments and agencies in its Foreign Assistance Dashboard Tracker, designed to monitor 
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Table 3: US ODA disbursements by government agency, 2005–2011 (in million US$ (% of total)) 
Agency 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
USDA 
3,838 
(13.7) 
160 
(.1) 
-145 
(-.1) 
-53 
(-.0) 
-75 
(-.0) 
94 
(.0) 
-31 
(-.0) 
DOD 
6,033 
(21.6) 
4,222 
(17.9) 
3,385 
(15.5) 
2,601 
(9.7) 
1,681 
(5.9) 
1,492 
(4.9) 
695 
(2.3) 
HHS 
1,464 
(5.2) 
1,759 
(7.5) 
2,304 
(10.6) 
3,305 
(12.3) 
2,811 
(9.9) 
3,118 
(10.3) 
3,560 
(11.6) 
State 
3,508 
(12.6) 
3,158 
(13.4) 
3,060 
(14) 
4,467 
(16.6) 
5,116 
(18.1) 
5,145 
(16.9) 
5,027 
(16.3) 
Treasury 
1,189 
(4.3) 
1,174 
(5) 
1,454 
(6.7) 
1,295 
(4.8) 
1,642 
(5.8) 
2,241 
(7.4) 
2,020 
(6.6) 
MCC 
52 
(.2) 
155 
(.6) 
308 
(1.4) 
590 
(2.3) 
932 
(3.3) 
1,429 
(4.7) 
1,620 
(5.3) 
USAID 
10,780 
(38.6) 
10,569 
(44.9) 
10,357 
(47.5) 
13,562 
(50.5) 
15,196 
(53.7) 
15,799 
(52.1) 
15,999 
(52) 
Other 
1,072 
(3.8) 
2,336 
(9.9) 
1,064 
(4.9) 
1,076 
(4) 
986 
(3.5) 
1,034 
(3.4) 
1,892 
(6.1) 
Total 27,935 23,532 21,787 26,842 28,290 30,353 30,783 
The negative figures for the USDA in select years reflect loan repayments related to USDA international programmes. 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on USAID (2013a) 
activities have marginal significance. In 2011, ODA attributed to diverse governmental 
entities ranged from US$ 1 million overseen by the Department of Homeland Security to 
more than US$ 17 billion overseen by USAID (USAID 2013a). As Tables 2 and 3 
indicate, USAID was the largest US ODA provider from 2005 to 2011. Both USAID and 
the State Department benefited from expanding aid volumes, and their share of overall aid 
rose in this period. The progression in funding to the State Department and USAID points 
to a general trend towards greater bureaucratic consolidation in the US development 
cooperation system. Still, ODA funding implemented by the State Department and USAID 
combined represented less than 70 per cent of the US ODA effort in 2011. 
Two key factors have contributed to this modest trend towards bureaucratic consolidation. 
First, the trend can be traced in part to reforms enacted in 2006 as part of the “F Process” 
under the administration of George W. Bush. These reforms were designed to present a 
strategic framework for US development cooperation programmes, streamline governmental 
budgetary and policy planning, and enhance coordination among government agencies 
                                                                                                                                                                              
bureaucratic implementation of US government aid transparency guidelines. See  
http://international.cgdev.org/page/us-foreign-assistance-dashboard-tracker. As of January 2014, only 
eight governmental ODA actors had published funding data on the US government’s Foreign 
Assistance Dashboard (http://www.foreignassistance.gov), though all agencies that receive or 
implement aid are expected to provide this information as the data platform develops. 
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engaged in global development. Although the F Process consolidated authority for USAID-
managed development accounts and many State Department programmes in the Office of 
the Director of Foreign Assistance within the State Department and gave this office a 
mandate to foster coordination among the broad spectrum of government agencies 
managing development-related funding, major funding vehicles – including the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) – 
fell outside of the office’s purview (Nowels / Veillette 2006).  
A second factor contributing to the consolidation of the development cooperation system 
around the State Department and USAID has been the declining role of the US Department 
of Defence (DOD) as an ODA provider in recent years. The DOD increased the scope of its 
ODA-eligible activities in connection with the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
during the George W. Bush administration. In 2005, the DOD was the second-largest US 
ODA provider behind USAID, administering nearly 20 per cent of US ODA (see Table 2). 
Though a large part of DOD development funding has related to post-conflict stabilisation 
and reconstruction efforts, the department has engaged in a broad spectrum of development-
related activities, including contributions to humanitarian relief operations and technical 
assistance to support security-sector reform (Patrick / Brown 2007). The DOD’s wide-
ranging portfolio in part reflects the limited capabilities that other governmental actors 
possess in engaging in difficult country contexts (Serafino 2008). 
The DOD also maintains an important role in the field of global health. The Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Foundation estimated that the DOD’s budget for global health-related activities in 
fiscal year 2012 amounted to nearly US$ 580 million, including investments in research and 
development, disease surveillance, and health care and training in partner countries 
(Michaud / Moss / Kates 2012).
17
 As the largest bureaucracy in the United States, the DOD 
has capabilities to mobilise and deploy resources internationally that other externally-
oriented agencies cannot match. This imbalance has raised concerns that, especially in the 
fragile contexts where the DOD is likely to be more active, military goals will take 
precedence over development objectives, and implementation lessons from development 
practice will be neglected (Patrick / Brown 2007). The example of the DOD underlines that 
bureaucracies bring power resources to the development policy arena that are independent 
of the level of development-related funding they oversee. 
At the same time, the figures presented in Table 2 indicate that the importance of the US 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as an aid provider has increased over the 
last decade. In 2011, ODA flows attributed to HHS topped US$ 4 billion, making HHS 
ODA comparable in scale to the overall aid budgets of Italy or Spain. Although health-
related development funding benefited from congressional support even in the 1990s, when 
US ODA commitments declined (Lundsgaarde 2013b), the major global health initiatives 
introduced during the administration of George W. Bush are a primary explanation for 
HHS’s expanded global role. Together with USAID, HHS became a major implementer of 
                                                          
17  As efforts to protect the health and military readiness of US forces are a key goal of this global health 
funding, a large share of the expenditures included in this estimate likely do not qualify as ODA. The 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation suggests that the accurate estimation of DOD contributions to global 
health is complicated by the diversity of DOD programmes and administrative departments within the 
DOD that are a source of this funding (Michaud / Moss / Kates 2012; Moss / Michaud 2013). 
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PEPFAR, launched in 2003, and the President’s Malaria Initiative, established in 2005.18 Its 
engagement in developing countries is mainly managed through the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), which focuses on improving health infrastructure, disease 
surveillance and training for medical professionals – an orientation distinct from the 
community-based health approach associated with USAID (Sessions s.a.). 
One sign of the growing self-perception of HHS as an international actor was its publication 
of a Global Health Strategy in 2011. The document underlines that the department justifies 
an expanded global role in terms of its contribution to addressing domestic public policy 
objectives. Although the strategy itself is framed in global terms, the need for a partner-
centred orientation and “whole of government” approaches and cooperation with the DOD 
and USAID in particular stress its relevance for engagement in developing-country contexts. 
In highlighting the value of mobilising expertise within the department to address global 
health problems and its capability to assume a brokering role by maintaining ties with 
partners such as counterparts within foreign health ministries, the Strategy outlines key 
elements of the department’s self-perception of its strengths as a global actor (Daulaire 
2012; US Department of Health and Human Services 2011). 
Many other US agencies that report funding qualifying as ODA have a comparatively small 
footprint in developing countries and provide funding or technical assistance directly related 
to their core areas of expertise. Examples include bilateral support from the US Treasury 
Department to assist partner countries in implementing economic reforms and support from 
the DOE to develop clean-energy partnerships (Lawson / Epstein 2009). 
The core of the US development policy system continues to be centred on the US State 
Department and USAID. The creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2003 
brought a new agency with a global development mandate into the system. Although there 
were initially concerns that the MCC’s creation would siphon resources away from USAID, 
MCC funding has remained small in comparison to USAID funding over the last decade 
(see Tables 2 and 3). The MCC was established to improve the business model of aid 
delivery by emphasising the selection of recipients on the basis of governmental 
performance, the support of programmes designed and implemented by partner countries, 
and attention to the measurement of results (Tarnoff 2013). The organisation provides an 
important example of how the priorities and operating methods of US bureaucracies can be 
shaped by the US Congress. In contrast to USAID, which has historically been hampered by 
congressional micromanagement linked to extensive earmarking (Lancaster 2007), the 
MCC’s authorising legislation permits it to adopt a more partner-driven approach to 
programme planning and implementation.
19
 Different legislative channels for authorising 
and funding US government agencies can enable some governmental actors to acquire 
support for their international work more easily than others. This may be viewed positively 
as an avenue for committing additional resources for development, or negatively as a force 
hindering the development of coherent strategies for international engagement.  
                                                          
18  In the 2012 fiscal year, funding allocated through PEPFAR (including US bilateral HIV/AIDS and 
tuberculosis programmes, as well as US contributions to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria, amounted to US$ 6.4 billion (PEPFAR s.a.). 
19  The legislative restrictions facing varied bureaucracies in the US system should therefore be taken into 
consideration in assessing organisational effectiveness. 
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Although the State Department has a leading role in providing overall guidance on questions 
related to development policy goals and aid-allocation preferences, USAID has a more 
important role in implementation. In fiscal year 2011, the State Department was responsible 
for implementing some 44 per cent of the foreign economic assistance it oversaw, while 
another 36 per cent of this State Department funding was implemented by USAID 
(2013b).
20
 A key example of the division between the State Department as a provider of 
policy guidance and other bureaucracies as implementers of State Department programmes 
is the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) in the State Department, established 
in 2003 to oversee the implementation of PEPFAR. In addition to formulating programme 
strategies and promoting common procedural standards, OGAC assumes a role as a 
convenor and arbitrator among US government agencies involved in the implementation of 
HIV/AIDS programmes, among which the CDC and USAID are the most significant (US 
Government Accountability Office 2009b). 
The importance of the US State Department in overseeing funding beyond the resources for 
which it holds direct implementation responsibility is captured in comparing the distribution 
of foreign economic assistance across government agencies (Table 4), with the summaries 
of ODA commitments and disbursements given in Tables 2 and 3. Foreign assistance is 
reported according to the agency that is allocated funding, while the US ODA figures 
summarised in Tables 2 and 3 reflect the role of diverse governmental actors in aid 
implementation.
21
 In Table 4, USAID remains the single-largest agency funded, though its 
relative weight in the system appears lower than in the ODA summary tables. Foreign 
economic assistance funded through HHS is notably lower than the level of ODA that it 
implements, indicating a transfer of resources from the State Department. The foreign 
economic assistance figures also highlight that the international roles of the US Department 
of Agriculture and the US Department of Energy are more important than their ODA 
implementation roles suggest. For the USDA, one key explanation for this is that it transfers 
implementation responsibility for a large component of food assistance programmes to 
USAID (Hanrahan 2013). The Department of Energy’s non-ODA international profile can 
be explained by the weight of cooperation programmes related to nuclear non-proliferation 
in its portfolio, where cooperation with Russia and Eastern and Central European countries 
holds special relevance. 
These examples highlight that agency influence over cooperation programmes is not 
reducible to the distribution of ODA funding across agencies alone. The differences in 
reported funding for foreign economic assistance and ODA programmes also indicate that 
internationally active bureaucracies are engaged in a variety of cooperative relationships 
with other bureaucracies, with one agency often implementing funding allocated to another. 
This simple observation underlines that agencies have varied competencies that are 
acknowledged by other governmental actors. The individual strengths of bureaucracies  
can include not only their specialised expertise, but also the policy networks and external  
                                                          
20  In this case, implementation can mean that funding is passed along to additional implementing entities 
such as multilateral organisations, foreign governments, non-profit organisations or for-profit 
contractors. 
21  Additional discrepancies between US foreign assistance reporting and ODA reporting include the 
different time periods for which data is reported (ODA is reported for a calendar year; foreign 
assistance for the fiscal year) and the different geographical scope of reporting, as ODA is limited to 
assistance provided to developing countries (USAID 2013a). 
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Table 4: US foreign economic assistance by agency, 2001–2010 (in million US$ (% of total)) 
Agency 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
USDA 
1,976 
(16) 
1,343 
(9.2) 
2,556 
(10) 
2,089 
(7.8) 
2,250 
(7.6) 
2,013 
(7.4) 
1,817 
(6.6) 
2,896 
(8.8) 
2,700 
(7.8) 
2,541 
(6.8) 
DOD 
393 
(3.2) 
373 
(2.6) 
2,044 
(8) 
4,792 
(17.9) 
7,137 
(24.1) 
4,952 
(18.3) 
1,837 
(6.6) 
2,145 
(6.5) 
1,389 
(4) 
1,597 
(4.3) 
DOE 
  371 
(1.4) 
523 
(2) 
1,249 
(4.2) 
1,224 
(4.5) 
1,802 
(6.5) 
1,665 
(5.1) 
746 
(2.1) 
1,037 
(2.8) 
HHS 
96 
(.8) 
146 
(1) 
257 
(1) 
571 
(2.1) 
691 
(2.3) 
901 
(3.3) 
893 
(3.2) 
932 
(2.8) 
1,211 
(3.5) 
1,030 
(2.8) 
State 
1,569 
(12.7) 
2,176 
(15) 
2,178 
(8.5) 
4,091 
(15.3) 
5,476 
(18.5) 
5,652 
(20.1) 
5,982 
(21.6) 
10,068 
(31) 
11,760 
(33.9) 
12,431 
(33.2) 
Treasury 
1,146 
(9.3) 
1,204 
(8.3) 
261 
(1) 
2,493 
(9.3) 
1,246 
(4.2) 
1,132 
(4.2) 
1,477 
(5.3) 
1,217 
(3.7) 
1,638 
(4.7) 
2,246 
(6) 
MCC 
   8 
(0) 
361 
(1.2) 
836 
(3.1) 
1,639 
(5.9) 
2,746 
(8.4) 
1,317 
(3.8) 
1,435 
(3.8) 
USAID 
6,576 
(53.4) 
8,665 
(59.6) 
17,300 
(67.5) 
11,446 
(42.8) 
10,444 
(35.3) 
9,707 
(36) 
11,528 
(41.6) 
10,445 
(31.8) 
13,175 
(37.9) 
14,251 
(38.1) 
Other 
562 
(4.6) 
628 
(4.3) 
679 
(2.6) 
737 
(2.8) 
726 
(2.5) 
717 
(2.6) 
723 
(2.6) 
765 
(2.3) 
781 
(2.2) 
837 
(2.2) 
Total 12,319 14,535 25,647 26,751 29,579 27,135 27,698 32,878 34,717 37,405 
Figures are in US$ millions. The numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of total US foreign economic assistance allocated 
to the agency in a given year. Figures from the following agencies are included in the “other” category: African Development 
Foundation, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, Department of Labour, Department of the Interior, Department of 
Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Trade Commission, the Inter-American Development Foundation, 
the National Science Foundation, the Open World Leadership Center, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Peace 
Corps, the Trade and Development Agency and the United States Institute for Peace. 
Source: USAID (2013b) 
constituencies that they have access to, or the implementation models that they are able to 
use (Nicholson-Crotty 2012; Wilson 1989). In the context of international cooperation, the 
access to a constituency within a given sector can provide support for resource mobilisation 
and potentially expand the array of domestic actors interested in engaging in international 
work. At the level of implementation within partner countries, access to sector-specific 
policy networks and constituencies can translate into partnerships with counterpart 
organisations, such as partner line ministries working within a given sector. 
As in the German case, the observation that numerous governmental actors engage in 
developing countries raises the question of how the comparative strengths of organisations 
in promoting international cooperation can be assessed. Many factors can contribute to 
organisational effectiveness. These factors include the area of specialisation, the available 
competencies of personnel, and the efficiency of administrative processes. The principles of 
aid effectiveness outlined in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action provide one 
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framework for assessing the advantages of governmental actors in promoting development 
goals.
22
 
An evaluation of US government performance in the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration highlighted variations among agencies in terms of organisational awareness of 
and commitment to aid-effectiveness principles. Examining seven key agencies engaging in 
developing-country contexts, the analysis identified the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
and the Treasury Department’s Office of Technical Assistance as the government agencies 
whose practices were most closely aligned with Paris Declaration principles (Blue / 
Eriksson / Heindel 2011).
23
 The evaluation concluded that development contributions from 
the Department of Health and Human Services were also consistent with the principles. 
Interestingly, USAID and the State Department were both considered to have internalised 
aid-effectiveness principles to a more limited degree, though the explanations for their 
reluctant embrace of the agenda differ. The legislative restrictions USAID is subject to limit 
its ability to use country systems and to coordinate with other aid providers. For the State 
Department, it is likely that the self-perception of its mandate as being the pursuit of foreign 
policy rather than development goals has contributed to limited internalisation of the 
principles (Blue / Eriksson / Heindel 2011).
24
 
This review of ODA trends in the United States reveals points of commonality and 
difference with the German system. Consistent with the German example, the State 
Department and USAID continue to occupy a central place within the policy system – a 
position that has been strengthened in recent years in spite of the presence of numerous 
other government agencies as ODA providers. In the United States, however, the State 
Department has a more dominant role in guiding policy and overseeing funding. While the 
environment ministry is the most prominent bureaucracy beyond the foreign affairs and 
development core in Germany, HHS and the DOD are key sector-specific ODA actors in the 
United States, signalling that global health and security issues represent policy areas where 
the management of cooperation among diverse governmental entities merits further 
attention. As in Germany, the description of internationalisation trends among sector-
specific actors ultimately leads to a discussion on the role of pivotal bureaucratic players 
(State and USAID) in the management of international cooperation, including reflection on 
the coordination role that they should assume as well as their added value in engaging in 
thematic areas where other bureaucratic actors hold some claim to expertise. 
                                                          
22  Although the aid-effectiveness principles outlined in the Paris Declaration reflect commitments made 
on behalf of donor governments, in practice some governmental actors may consider the principles to 
reflect a bias linked to the interests of the development cooperation community. Actors that were not 
involved in negotiating aid effectiveness agreements may not be keen to be evaluated according to the 
indicators of good performance suggested in the agreements. 
23  The consistency of the Millennium Challenge Corporation with Paris Declaration principles reflects the 
influence of accepted tenets of aid effectiveness, including the importance of country ownership on the 
MCC business model at the time of its creation in 2003. The mandate of the Treasury Department’s 
Technical Assistance Programme to directly support partner-country governments explains its 
adherence to Paris principles (Blue / Eriksson / Heindel 2011). 
24  The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review published in 2010 indicated that the 
commitment to aid-effectiveness principles in the State Department and USAID implementation of 
foreign assistance resources would be strengthened in the future (US State Department / USAID 2010). 
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3 Intra-governmental coordination in practice 
The review above of general funding trends across ministerial lines indicates that many 
governmental actors sometimes play a substantial role in development cooperation. The 
engagement of diverse ministries can be attributed to a perception of value-added through 
the mobilisation of additional resources, the provision of sectoral expertise, the expansion of 
networks or the reliance on implementation channels that offer an alternative to the 
operating models favoured by bilateral and multilateral development agencies. This positive 
view of the contribution of line ministries mirrors an assertion found in broader discussions 
on the role of new actors in international development (Zimmermann / Smith 2011) 
recognising that pluralism can increase global commitments to addressing development 
goals and expand the choices available to partner countries. However, the diversification of 
the actor landscape in development cooperation – whether through the expanding cast of 
states funding global development efforts, the rise of private aid providers or the variety of 
governmental engagement within OECD-DAC donor countries – also carries a potential 
downside if diverse approaches lead to goal conflicts, a duplication of work and an 
increased administrative burden on populations that are supposed to benefit from assistance. 
These potential challenges were a primary motive for the commitments that donor countries 
undertook to improve aid effectiveness in the last decade. 
This section reviews key inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms that are in place in 
Germany and the United States to promote consistent action in international cooperation. In 
both cases, channels for information exchange and cooperation among government agencies 
are more extensive and diverse than the examples that are provided. Coordination 
mechanisms can vary in terms of the specific issues or geographical contexts they address, 
their formality, the regularity of their use, and which governmental actors and external 
stakeholders participate. This analysis does not attempt a full inventory of coordination 
mechanisms, but even a more complete delineation of such mechanisms alone would not be 
able to render a judgment on their effectiveness in promoting potential synergies across 
government departments, limiting overlapping mandates and harmonising business 
practices. In spite of these limitations, the outline of key characteristics of each system’s 
mechanisms for orchestrating information exchange and collaboration among ministries 
provides a basis for identifying potential problem areas in the management of international 
cooperation in each country. 
3.1 Inter-ministerial coordination in Germany 
In the German parliamentary system of government, the composition of the executive 
depends on the composition of the legislature. The executive is therefore primarily 
responsible for agenda-setting as well as policy implementation. Although the Chancellor 
presides over the governmental bureaucracy and provides the general political direction 
for the government, the Ressortprinzip (Departmental Principle) outlined in the German 
constitution grants authority to ministers within the cabinet to independently manage the 
policy areas that they are appointed to oversee.
25
 The same principle underlines the 
autonomy of ministries and their non-hierarchical relationship to one another within the 
                                                          
25  See http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/analysen/2009/richtlinienkompetenz_des_bundeskanzlers.pdf. 
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cabinet. While the existence of an independent ministry dealing with development 
cooperation is generally considered to be an advantage for the promotion of development 
policy goals within the German system, the principle of non-interference across policy 
portfolios limits the ability of the BMZ to influence or coordinate the activities of other 
ministries. There has also traditionally been no overall coordinating entity for 
development issues within the government (OECD 1995; OECD 2002).
26
 
The policy coherence for development debate has drawn attention to potential 
inconsistencies across policy fields with implications for developing countries as well as 
the mechanisms for intra-governmental coordination designed to limit contradictions in 
foreign policy. As this debate gained prominence, many OECD-DAC governments 
introduced organisational reforms to stimulate cross-governmental exchange on the 
development impact of policies in diverse thematic areas. In the German context, 
numerous measures were introduced after 1998 to strengthen the position of the BMZ vis-
à-vis other ministries in encouraging the adoption of development-friendly global policies. 
Reforms to promote coherence were generally procedural in character, for example 
relating to inter-ministerial consultation in the formulation of country strategies, the 
intensification of bilateral meetings between the BMZ and other ministries to discuss 
coherence, and the increase in opportunities by the BMZ to review legislation for its 
development impact (Ashoff 2005; OECD 2006). The creation of a unit within the BMZ 
to promote policy coherence and coordination across ministries provided an organisational 
innovation to encourage consistency of external action. Given the limited capacities of this 
small unit, however, the BMZ has largely been confined to assuming an advocacy role in 
relation to other ministries on development issues (Galeazzi et al. 2013). Whereas many 
small-scale measures have been introduced to encourage informal exchange across 
ministerial lines related to engagement with developing countries, hierarchical 
coordination mechanisms are scarcely used. 
Although the limited ability of the BMZ to shape the policy agendas of other ministries in 
the context of promoting policy coherence for development is understandable – given 
differences in the underlying interest bases of governmental entities – the BMZ also faces 
constraints in promoting inter-ministerial coordination in the narrow field related to 
resource transfers to developing countries that qualify as ODA. Nevertheless, the German 
government has introduced measures in recent years to improve the coordination of 
resource flows to developing countries. In 2010, for example, an inter-ministerial contact 
group (the Ressortkreis Technische Zusammenarbeit und ODA-Transparenz) was created 
in connection with the merger of German implementing organisations in the field of 
technical cooperation. Guided by the BMZ through its policy planning staff and open to 
participation from all ministries, the committee aims to increase the transparency of 
resource flows from different governmental entities and to improve the common oversight 
of technical cooperation. 
                                                          
26  The 2005 DAC Peer Review of Germany (OECD 2006) suggests that the Federal Chancellery assumes 
a central coordinating role in German development cooperation, as its structure reflects the remainder 
of the federal bureaucracy in miniature. The report nevertheless also indicates that the ability of the 
Chancellery to perform a coordination mandate is restricted by its capacity constraints, given the small 
number of personnel working on development issues. 
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At its inception, this formalised coordination forum was expected to meet at least twice 
yearly and centre on information exchange. A follow-up agreement concerning the ODA 
coordination role of the BMZ within the federal government emphasises the importance of 
improved reporting on ODA activities as a basis for inter-ministerial exchange; it also 
suggests that coordination does not amount to joint planning or imply that the BMZ has a 
responsibility to steer the activities of other ministries (German Bundestag 2011; BMZ 
2013). The limitations in existing inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms – with 
respect to their mandates and scope as a platform for common planning – highlight a 
contradiction in the role of the BMZ in steering relations with developing countries. 
Although one perceived advantage of the BMZ is its ability to promote a cross-sectoral 
perspective in programming cooperation instruments, this cross-sectoral mandate largely 
applies to the resources that the BMZ controls.
27
 Without a coordinating competence 
across the government, the ministry does not have the power to foster a systemic 
perspective for German engagement in developing countries in its entirety.  
As suggested above, the Foreign Office also has a cross-governmental coordination 
mandate, owing to embassy oversight of country-level cooperation programmes.
28
 Its 
coordination role in developing-country contexts has nevertheless been more visible in 
areas linked to its core funding mandates. For example, the Foreign Office maintains a 
leadership role in the humanitarian aid arena, where a cross-governmental contact group 
created in 2004 meets on a bi-monthly basis to exchange information and discuss the 
harmonisation of approaches to crisis prevention. A 2010 assessment of the government’s 
action plan in this area suggested that although the contact group had contributed to 
strengthening joint approaches to crisis prevention, project planning related to the issue 
remained largely in the hands of individual ministries (German Federal Government 
2010). The limited financial weight of the Foreign Office in other areas, particularly those 
related to peace and security promotion, has created tension with the BMZ and has 
provided an explanation for the Foreign Office’s restrained strategic role in shaping 
German engagement with developing countries in the past (Mair 2009). The Foreign 
Office’s growing interest in assuming a leadership role in strategy development towards 
certain regions, including Africa and Latin America, as well as with the “shaping powers” 
signals that the ministry is keen to expand its overall coordinating role in international 
cooperation. 
                                                          
27  The ability of the BMZ to influence the approaches of other ministries likely varies according to the 
specific issue being addressed as well as the procedures in place to facilitate coordination in a given 
area. As an example, the last DAC peer review of Germany described cooperation between the BMZ 
and BMU within the context of the International Climate Initiative as a positive case of policy 
coherence for development. Cooperation in this area is based on an inter-departmental agreement that 
foresees early and close consultation among the ministries in shaping the overall programme and 
individual projects, which is complemented by other procedures to promote common positions and 
joint responsibility in the climate policy arena (OECD 2010). 
28  The representation of German interests abroad, the promotion of external relations in areas including 
development policy and the coordination of the foreign-policy related activities of German public-
sector institutions in the framework of the federal government’s foreign policy are among the core 
tasks assigned to the German Foreign Service (BMJ 2011). The last point emphasises the 
representational mandate of the Foreign Service for the entire government and hints that the Foreign 
Office’s formal cross-governmental mandate may be higher at the country-level than within inter-
ministerial dialogue in Germany. 
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This brief overview of inter-ministerial coordination as it relates to German engagement in 
developing countries indicates that, although numerous small-scale mechanisms have been 
introduced in recent years to foster information exchange across ministerial lines, 
mechanisms to promote cross-governmental coherence through joint planning remain 
limited due to the principle of departmental independence, the lack of overarching 
coordination structures within the German government, and the overlapping mandates of 
the Foreign Office and the BMZ in guiding engagement in developing countries. The 
importance of the BMZ and the Foreign Office in shaping international cooperation 
derived from the financial resources they oversee and their role in influencing the 
approaches adopted by other ministries should make the clarification of their respective 
roles and the assessment of their individual competencies a key preoccupation in 
discussions on improving inter-ministerial coordination on development issues. 
3.2 Inter-agency coordination in the United States 
Many observers have pointed to the need for improvements in coordination among the 
multitude of US governmental actors engaging in the global development arena. The US 
development cooperation system differs from Germany’s not only due to its scale – 
suggesting the potential for a more diverse range of coordination challenges in 
international cooperation – but also due to the American system of divided government.29 
While the President selects the heads of federal bureaucracies and many additional 
management appointments and provides direction for the executive agencies, the US 
Congress also influences the work of federal bureaucracies by setting the parameters for 
regulatory policy, appropriating funding and providing continuous oversight. The 
legislative branch can also shape the organisation and mandates of different components 
of the federal bureaucracy (Halperin / Clapp / Kanter 2006). Legislative authority related 
to global development programmes is spread across different committees in the US 
Congress: responsibility for food aid, contributions to multilateral development banks and 
bilateral development assistance is notably dispersed (Tarnoff / Lawson 2009). The 
complex legislative setting influencing international cooperation programmes has been 
widely acknowledged as a source of diffuse goals and bureaucratic procedures across the US 
development policy system. 
Within the executive branch, there are numerous mechanisms to encourage greater 
consistency in action across government agencies. The National Security Council (NSC) sits 
at the apex of inter-agency coordination structures. Its potential to assume an overarching 
role in outlining US development policy priorities, arbitrating among agencies and 
coordinating policy implementation was emphasised in the Obama administration’s 2010 
Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD) with a commitment to establish 
                                                          
29  Another key difference relates to the implementation structure of development cooperation. In 
Germany, there is a concentrated implementation landscape that puts heavy reliance on the GIZ as an 
implementing agent for technical assistance and the KfW Development Bank as an implementing agent 
for financial assistance. The US implementation landscape is fragmented due to the extensive 
involvement of private contractors. Differences in foreign policy priorities also influence the character 
of coordination challenges across the two countries, as the United States has generally emphasised 
security concerns as a rationale for international engagement, whereas German foreign policy has 
traditionally emphasised economic concerns.  
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an Interagency Policy Committee on Global Development under the aegis of the NSC.
30
 
Given the emphasis on consensus decision-making among agencies represented in various 
inter-agency policy committees and sub-committees associated with the NSC, and their 
limited ability to compel other agencies to change policy directions in this setting, the NSC 
may, in practice, lack the capacities to put forward a strategy to guide the cooperation 
programmes of diverse agencies or to assure cross-governmental coordination on 
development issues (Lawson / Epstein 2009). 
As in the German case, the limited ability of structures associated with the office of the 
executive to perform a cross-governmental coordinating function that encompasses efforts 
to develop common strategies and undertake joint planning efforts encourages reflection on 
how cross-governmental coherence and coordination can be promoted at the ministerial 
level. In contrast to the German case, the leading US governmental development agency, 
USAID, is in a clearly subordinate position to the State Department in this regard. USAID 
holds claim to expertise in overseeing the implementation of development projects in 
diverse sectors and has, under the Obama administration, undertaken an internal reform 
programme (USAID Forward) to strengthen its organisational competencies and capacities 
in order to elevate the position of USAID within the US development policy system (OECD 
2011). Nevertheless, the State Department maintains a leading role in guiding US 
international engagement and has a coordination mandate vis-à-vis US agencies with 
international programmes (Whittaker et al. 2011). 
The coordination mandate of the State Department takes different forms. As a result of 
reforms initiated under the George W. Bush administration, an Office of Foreign Assistance 
Resources was established in 2006 to foster strategic coherence and consolidate policy and 
budgetary planning across the State Department and USAID. Although the establishment of 
this office initially implied greater State Department control over USAID’s internal 
planning, under the Obama administration USAID has regained lost planning 
competencies.
31
 
A report prepared by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessing the 
experiences of the initial phase of consolidation of planning and budgetary competencies 
revealed several challenges in reforming the organisational structure for managing 
international cooperation. In addition to raising the concern that reporting benchmarks and 
timelines for reform implementation were insufficiently developed, the report underlined 
that the new office’s mandate did not yet extend to all State Department and USAID-
managed programmes, much less the programmes funded by other government agencies. 
The report also highlighted that the State Department had not sufficiently taken into 
consideration the need to tailor a human resources strategy to the functional needs of the 
new office, drawing attention to the importance of ensuring that the desired roles, 
competencies and composition of the involved workforce were well-defined. Finally, the 
GAO report signalled that the office faced challenges in communicating its output both 
                                                          
30  A summary of the PPD can be accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/ 
fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy. Although the PPD refers to the creation of an Interagency 
Policy Committee, this represents a re-labelling or reaffirmation of an existing coordination forum.  
31  See http://www.state.gov/f/.  
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within the State / USAID apparatus and with external stakeholders (US Government 
Accountability Office 2009a). 
The importance of improving coordination in international action across government was 
emphasised in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), led by the 
State Department. To promote “whole of government” cooperation in a variety of country 
contexts, the QDDR emphasises strengthening the coordination role of the State Department 
at the country level. To this end, the QDDR recommends reaffirming the central role of the 
heads of diplomatic missions in overseeing the development of country assistance strategies 
and increasing their involvement in headquarters-level policy-making processes (US State 
Department / USAID 2010). The review acknowledges that improving coordination might 
also result from increased selection of mission directors on the basis of their experience with 
inter-agency relations and the heightened reliance on other governmental agencies with 
relevant competencies as implementing partners.
32
 The proposal to elevate the coordination 
role of country mission directors does not reflect a fundamental change in the mandate of 
diplomatic missions; rather, it highlights that, in practice, directives from the headquarters of 
US agencies represented in specific countries have interfered with efforts to promote 
coherent country-level action (Marks / Lamb 2012). 
The State Department also already assumes a coordination mandate within specific sectors 
where diverse governmental agencies are active. Through functional offices such as the 
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilisation Operations, the Office of Global Food Security, the 
Office of Global Health Diplomacy, and the Bureau of Energy Resources, the State 
Department is responsible for guiding diplomatic efforts, including participation in 
multilateral initiatives in these sectors and developing policy on the basis of input from other 
bureaucracies. These offices are still young and therefore illustrate challenges that the State 
Department faces in orchestrating US efforts in policy areas where its own capacities are not 
well-developed. 
The existence of functional offices that deal with varied sectors relevant for engaging with 
developing countries within the lead bureaucracy for managing international relations does 
not erase claims that other bureaucracies might have in directing action in specific sectors on 
the basis of their expertise. As an example, although the Office of Global Food Security 
might be considered an overarching structure for coordinating the contributions of various 
US government agencies, in the context of the presidential Feed the Future initiative, 
coordination responsibilities for the programme are divided between the State Department, 
which focuses on engagement with multilateral initiatives, and USAID, which acts as the 
                                                          
32  The QDDR highlights that attention to improving inter-agency coordination is especially relevant with 
respect to emerging powers, regional centres of influence and countries with a large inter-agency 
presence (countries where US funding is likely to be more significant such as Afghanistan and 
Pakistan). The reinforcement of the State Department role in country-level coordination has already 
taken place in the Afghanistan-Pakistan context. A congressional evaluation of US foreign assistance 
efforts in Afghanistan conducted following the attribution of additional oversight responsibilities to the 
State Department concluded that while the whole-of-government approach involving the supervision of 
14 governmental entities at the embassy had experienced successes, the heightened State Department 
role also created challenges related to the introduction of new bureaucratic processes and the 
diminished voice and decision-making powers of development experts on stabilisation and 
reconstruction issues within the country (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2011).  
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lead agency in the initiative overseeing both analytical and policy inputs and the 
coordination of the 10 US agencies involved, including the USDA, the MCC and the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, among others.
33
 
Given the high volumes of funding dedicated to global health goals over the last decade, 
efforts to synchronise cross-governmental action in this domain point to core challenges in 
reforming the coordination infrastructure for engagement with developing countries. 
Expanded funding for global health has led to the creation of a series of offices anchored in 
the State Department to oversee international health efforts. With the creation of PEPFAR in 
2003, the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator was established to provide governmental 
leadership on HIV/AIDS issues and supervise implementation of the initiative by numerous 
agencies, of which the CDC and USAID were the most important. In 2009, PEPFAR 
coordination was subsumed under the presidential Global Health Initiative, which aimed to 
unify governmental action in the field of global health more broadly. In the summer of 2012, 
the Global Health Initiative was dissolved and replaced by the current Office of Global 
Health Diplomacy.
34
 
The State Department’s leadership and coordination role in this domain can be debated 
from at least two perspectives. First, because of an imbalance between health-funding 
increases and attention to the organisational and administrative resources needed to 
oversee their implementation, bureaucratic capabilities to mobilise expertise and direct 
implementation remained stronger in other agencies, notably within HHS and its Office of 
Global Health Affairs (Feldbaum 2010).
35
 Second, the competence of the State 
Department in assuming a leading role in the global health domain has been questioned. 
One key argument for transitioning the responsibility of the coordination of global health 
programmes – including the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator – to USAID is that, as 
an operational actor, USAID has accumulated more direct experience in implementing 
health financing, implying competencies related not only to an understanding of the issue 
area but also to knowledge on how to effectively design monitoring and accountability 
frameworks (Glassman / Duran 2012). 
The observation that the State Department may lack the capabilities or the competencies to 
effectively guide and coordinate the work of other government agencies engaging in 
developing countries is not unique to the global health field. Although the State Department 
may have expertise in developing governance frameworks, it does not have, for example, 
the operational capacity to contribute significantly to conflict stabilisation and 
reconstruction efforts without support from the Department of Defence (Eastman 2012). 
Arguing against the further consolidation of cooperation programmes in the hands of the 
State Department, three former USAID administrators highlighted that the State 
Department’s short-term orientation and an organisational culture at odds with a 
                                                          
33  See http://www.feedthefuture.gov/about. 
34  The demise of the Global Health Initiative is discussed in the following blog post: 
http://international.cgdev.org/blog/failure-launch-post-mortem-ghi-10. One proposed change linked to 
the creation of the Office of Global Health Diplomacy was to strengthen the role of US ambassadors in 
developing-country-level partnerships for health (Salaam-Blyther 2013).  
35  The Office of Global Health Affairs was renamed the Office of Global Affairs in 2010, indicative of 
the expanding international role of the HHS (Bliss 2014). 
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development outlook offered reasons to limit its responsibilities in overseeing US foreign 
assistance programmes (Atwood / McPherson / Natsios 2008). At the same time, these 
authors acknowledged the long-term decline of the capabilities of USAID as an organisation 
as a factor that contributed to the proliferation of government agencies assuming an 
operational role internationally. The authors emphasised that the agency’s capabilities would 
need to be bolstered in order for it to effectively promote coherence within the US 
development policy system on its own. 
Although the need to formulate coherent cross-governmental strategies for engagement in 
varied country contexts and to improve mechanisms for coordinating the contributions of 
various government agencies has been acknowledged in overarching policy documents such 
as the PPD and the QDDR, the challenges the US government faces in designing and 
operationalising coordination structures in global development remain significant. As in 
Germany, a key question concerns the appropriate division of labour between the State 
Department and agencies with a functional and operational mandate. The QDDR signalled 
that the pre-eminence of the State Department in guiding international cooperation should 
be reinforced by upgrading the role of embassies in inter-agency processes (US State 
Department / USAID 2010). At the same time, current offices within the State Department 
related to the coordination of sector-specific activities face constraints with respect to their 
capacities and competencies to manage issue linkages. Moving forward, whether and how to 
strengthen the functional competencies of the State Department in fields relevant to 
engagement with developing countries will represent a key area for reflection on the reform 
of the US development policy system. 
Much of the foregoing discussion implies that organisational coherence derives from a 
clarification of the mandate for coordination that government agencies possess within an 
international cooperation system and the extent to which their organisational characteristics 
and resources allow them to fully exercise that mandate. Yet, greater coherence may also 
result from the consolidation of international programmes and the reduction of actors and 
initiatives to coordinate. The US tendency to establish new initiatives and implementation 
structures – instead of confronting underlying problems in the legislative framework 
influencing international cooperation – potentially leads to dispersed small-scale 
programmes addressing similar issues, encouraging a duplication of effort and limiting the 
benefits of scale. A recent proposal by the Center for Global Development to bring together 
US government programmes to stimulate private sector development and leverage private 
investments in developing countries under the roof of a strengthened Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation provides an example of how functional consolidation within 
agencies possessing a core competence in a specific area could reduce inefficiencies in 
international engagement (Leo / Moss / Schwanke 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
Erik Lundsgaarde 
28 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
4 Proposals for organisational reform 
Reforms to improve the coherence of systems of cooperation with developing countries 
can take place at multiple levels. Summarising lessons learnt from its donor peer reviews, 
the OECD-DAC identifies the clarification of strategic frameworks, the consolidation of 
governmental responsibilities for overseeing aid programmes, the limitation of sectoral 
and geographical priorities, and the introduction of performance-based management 
systems as key corridors of action to promote more effective donor engagement (OECD 
2008a). Additional factors that can influence the effectiveness of cooperation programmes 
include the selection and design of cooperation instruments and the extent of coordination 
with other aid providers. Reforms at different levels within a cooperation system may be 
difficult to separate, as the strategic framework can, for example, influence the attribution 
of responsibilities among governmental actors and define principles for country-level 
engagement. While recognising the multi-level character of cooperation systems, this 
section highlights key proposals to improve organisational coherence in the management 
of international cooperation efforts in Germany and the United States that focus on the 
division of responsibilities among bureaucracies. 
The question of whether and how the organisation of cooperation with developing 
countries should be reformed requires consideration of the underlying goal system that 
guides cooperation. The reform proposals outlined below mostly originate from within the 
development policy community. As a result, these proposals generally adopt the 
perspective that organisational reforms should aim to improve the ability of donor 
governments to effectively promote economic development and poverty reduction in 
partner countries. An emphasis on the promotion of environmental sustainability as a core 
element of a foreign policy agenda could lead to different conclusions about the 
appropriate division of labour among governmental actors. The interests guiding 
engagement have always been more diverse than the putatively altruistic motives with 
which development cooperation as a policy field has often been associated. The 
involvement of diverse ministries in international cooperation signals the need for donor 
governments to transparently discuss this interest complex and to define the foreign policy 
agenda against which efforts to improve organisational coherence can be measured. 
4.1 Organisational reform proposals in Germany 
The challenges that the diverse landscape of governmental actors in German development 
cooperation present for the effectiveness and visibility of development contributions have 
been acknowledged for decades. Proposals for reforming German cooperation structures 
have drawn attention to issues related not only to the division of ministerial responsibilities 
but also to the internal capacities of leading governmental actors (i.e. the BMZ) and the 
reorganisation of the aid implementation apparatus. The consolidation of the German 
implementation landscape has represented an especially important concern in recent years. 
Abandoning the separation of responsibilities for the implementation of financial and 
technical assistance between different parastatal organisations has been a recurring 
recommendation among policy analysts (Ashoff 2009; OECD 1995; OECD 2002; OECD 
2006). The gradual consolidation of parastatal organisations delivering technical assistance 
– progressing notably with the merger of the GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für technische 
Zusammenarbeit), InWent (Capacity Building International) and DED (German 
Development Service) under the umbrella of the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
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internationale Zusammenarbeit) in 2011 – has led to some rationalisation of the 
implementing structures but not to a resolution of the institutional separation of financial 
and technical assistance. 
Governmental proposals to improve organisational coherence to advance development goals 
have been summarised in regular OECD Peer Reviews of German development 
cooperation. The 1995 peer review made note of two main proposals to foster coherence: the 
creation of a “Development Cabinet” to offer a consensus-based inter-ministerial forum to 
review policies concerning engagement with developing countries, and the consolidation of 
ministerial responsibilities for development policy by shifting the oversight of issues such as 
environmental cooperation and humanitarian assistance to the BMZ (OECD 1995). Rather 
than emphasising the functional role of the BMZ vis-à-vis other ministries, a subsequent 
internal review of the ministry focused on the appropriate division of labour between the 
BMZ and implementing organisations. The review suggested that ministerial participation in 
strategy development, international policy dialogue and the promotion of coherence within 
the German government should be prioritised over intensive engagement in project 
management (OECD 1998). The 1998 peer review signalled that the internal competence 
assessment of the BMZ could be a building block for a more comprehensive analysis of the 
functionality of the entire development cooperation system. In the years that followed, 
development cooperation reforms continued to have a small-scale character, relating largely 
to reorganisation efforts within the ministry and measures introduced to facilitate 
cooperation among implementing organisations. 
As referenced above, the rising salience of the policy coherence for development agenda 
enlarged the toolbox at the BMZ’s disposal to serve as an advocate for development goals 
within the broader external relations apparatus. Over time, measures were also introduced to 
improve data collection on resource flows qualifying as ODA from governmental actors 
beyond the BMZ and the Foreign Office (OECD 2002). Nevertheless, more than a decade 
later, the most recent DAC peer review of Germany noted that the BMZ still lacked the 
capacity to engage on the full range of questions related to its core development mandate, 
and therefore continued to face difficulties in shaping political debates or assuming a 
coordinating role vis-à-vis other ministries (OECD 2010). 
The limitations in the observed ability of the BMZ to play a coordination role in relation to 
other German ministries, whether in terms of guiding regulatory policy or influencing the 
management of resource flows, has informed academic proposals on how to improve 
organisational coherence in engaging with developing countries. Brombacher’s (2009) 
analysis of organisational reform options for the German development cooperation system 
implies that designing an institutional set-up to effectively promote development goals 
should not only involve reflection on which governmental actors should be assigned a 
coordination responsibility but also about their capabilities to promote both coordinated 
government action and development objectives. One main reform proposal would involve 
maintaining the independent cabinet-level status of the BMZ but strengthening its 
coordination mandate. This coordination mandate would be assured through a 
supplementary cross-governmental forum that could potentially be overseen by the Federal 
Chancellery.
36
 
                                                          
36  Scholz and Kaul (2013) similarly propose that the appointment of a special representative for global 
affairs and sustainable development within the Federal Chancellery to coordinate governmental action 
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While the attribution of additional powers to the BMZ in Brombacher’s first reform 
proposal does not resolve the basic overlap in geographical competences with the Foreign 
Office, his second reform proposal suggests that the integration of the BMZ into the 
Foreign Office offers another pathway to enhance the coherence of the external relations 
apparatus. Referring to the experiences of progressive donor countries, including the 
Netherlands and Denmark, Brombacher notes that a merger of foreign affairs and 
development portfolios would not necessarily undermine the pursuit of a development 
agenda. To balance foreign policy and development interests within a reformed 
organisational structure, attention would need to be given to issues such as how personnel 
within the ministry rotate to diffuse expertise related to global development within the 
organisation. This reform proposal therefore involves more than the absorption of the 
BMZ’s resources and functional responsibilities into the Foreign Office and implies that 
the Foreign Office would need to embark on an internal adaptation process to fulfil its 
expanded mandate (Brombacher 2009).
37
 
Faust and Messner (2012) similarly take the current limitations of the BMZ in asserting a 
coordination role across the spectrum of activities related to engagement in developing 
countries as a starting point for proposing four alternative options for organising the German 
ministerial landscape for international cooperation in the future. Among the four reform 
options, two follow from the assumption that the global development agenda is becoming 
more expansive. The first of these reform options would consist of enlarging the functional 
mandate of an independent development ministry to assume responsibility for most 
dimensions of cooperation with non-OECD countries. A key element of this proposal would 
be the consolidation of international cooperation programmes in areas related to food 
security, climate and energy policy, and research cooperation under the roof of a “Ministry 
for Global Development”, thus diminishing the role of sector-specific ministries as aid 
providers. Several reservations can be expressed with regard to this proposal: 1) it does not 
resolve the basic coordination challenge between the Foreign Office and the BMZ, as the 
Foreign Office would maintain a universal mandate for overseeing engagement at the 
country level; 2) it neglects both the rationale for sector-specific engagement in international 
cooperation as well as the expertise that line ministries can contribute; 3) it does not explain 
why a new independent ministry would overcome the structural challenges that the BMZ 
currently faces in advancing development goals within the German government. 
A second proposal outlined by Faust and Messner (2012) would involve strengthening the 
capacities of sector-specific ministries as international actors and integrating the BMZ’s 
global poverty-reduction mandate into the work programme of the Foreign Office. This 
proposal would imply a need to develop capacities within the Foreign Office, not only to 
absorb a larger cooperation portfolio but also to assume a stronger coordination role vis-à-
                                                                                                                                                                              
would be one important element of better orchestrating the international contributions of various 
ministries and developing stronger joint positions in multilateral discussions concerning environmental 
sustainability.  
37  As a third possible institutional reform option, Brombacher proposes the creation of a cabinet-level 
development committee – a coordination forum based on consensus decision-making among all 
ministries engaging in developing countries. This reform proposal assumes that there will be no shift in 
the attribution of responsibilities for coordination at the ministerial level and (as in other reform 
proposals) that the participation of diverse ministries in international cooperation will persist 
(Brombacher 2009).  
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vis sector-specific ministries that allows for joint planning and the consolidation of 
programmes and projects in particular areas. As Faust and Messner acknowledge, 
challenges related to the implementation of this proposal would include how to transfer 
lessons learnt from decades of development cooperation to the Foreign Office and sector-
specific ministries, and how to effectively organise the linkage between domestic and 
internationally oriented work areas within the sector-specific ministries themselves. At the 
same time, this pathway for organisational reform might be advantageous because it: 1) 
removes the overlapping governmental coordination mandates of the Foreign Office and the 
BMZ; 2) recognises the expertise of sector-specific actors; and 3) attributes responsibilities 
for overseeing global development objectives to a powerful ministry that should be in a 
stronger position to influence how other ministries engage globally. 
The reform of a country’s external-affairs apparatus is a complex undertaking. Although the 
reform proposals outlined above provide frameworks for orienting thinking on the 
advantages and disadvantages of different courses of action, they do not present a detailed 
set of recommendations on how the government should proceed with reform deliberations 
and the possible redesign of Germany’s foreign affairs and development policy system. The 
reform proposals nevertheless suggest that governmental debate on the appropriate 
institutional set-up to guide international cooperation in the future can be organised around 
four core questions: 1) What are the main elements of the goal system that determines what 
functions governmental actors need to perform in international cooperation? 2) What 
functional competencies should be assigned to which governmental actors? 3) What 
institutional measures are needed to promote cross-governmental coordination? 4) How can 
the capabilities of governmental actors be strengthened to match expectations related to the 
functional and coordination mandates they are attributed? These guiding questions are also 
relevant in considering the future organisation of international cooperation in the United 
States and other donor contexts. 
4.2 Organisational reform proposals in the United States 
Although initiatives to stimulate discussion and political momentum around the reform of 
the US foreign assistance system have been a recurring feature for half a century, policy 
review processes initiated by both the executive branch and Congress involving key 
stakeholder voices outside of government have often had a limited impact in promoting 
comprehensive organisational reform (Nowels 2007). Over the last decade, reform needs 
within the US system have been outlined in numerous reports, drawing attention to several 
common themes, including the necessity of clarifying the underlying strategic framework 
guiding foreign assistance flows, the importance of upgrading the civilian dimension of US 
foreign policy and streamlining international programmes to avoid duplication and foster 
coordination (Center for US Global Engagement 2009; Epstein / Weed 2009). Key elements 
of these reform proposals have been incorporated into draft legislation introduced in 
Congress in recent years (US House of Representatives 2009, 2013), which has, however, 
languished in the legislative process. 
At least two main types of reform proposals address how to adapt the strategic framework 
for US global development efforts to meet current challenges. At one fundamental level, 
numerous analyses have promoted the revision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(HELP Commission 2007; Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network 2008). Although this 
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legislation was initially regularly revisited and amended to reflect shifting priorities, nearly 
30 years have passed since the authorising framework has been substantively reviewed. The 
appropriations process has become more important in outlining aid priorities as a result, and 
a variety of programmes have been established through separate authorisation channels, 
including PEPFAR and the MCC (Rennick / Chesser 2011). In addition to clarifying the 
core objectives of US global engagement, advocates of such a reform suggest that revised 
authorising legislation is necessary to curb the proliferation of programmes, initiatives and 
funding channels and to define the roles and responsibilities of government agencies 
engaging internationally. 
A second type of strategic reform involves the formulation of a comprehensive global 
development strategy (Center for US Global Engagement 2009; US Government 
Accountability Office 2009a; Oxfam America / Center for American Progress 2009; Unger 
2010; Brigety / Dewan 2009). A global development strategy would, on the one hand, 
affirm the importance of development goals alongside other foreign policy and security 
objectives, and on the other hand outline a limited number of priority areas of investment. 
The emphasis placed on the need to develop a “comprehensive” strategy reflects the 
currently limited reach of core executive agencies (the State Department and USAID) in 
promoting a unified framework for international cooperation across the government. The 
2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development foresaw the establishment of a 
quadrennial national development strategy as one of several mechanisms to promote 
development policy coherence (White House 2010); however, this has not yet been 
institutionalised. 
Because strategy development implies not only the formulation of core priorities but also the 
indication of how the government will organise actions to achieve them, the clarification of 
the strategic framework guiding US contributions to global development invariably also 
carries implications for the distribution of authority across government agencies. Similar to 
the German case, organisational reform proposals have primarily focused on the respective 
roles of the State Department and USAID or possible successor organisations: 
recommendations on how to adjust the positions of sector-specific agencies within the 
policy system appear as footnotes to the debate on the appropriate institutional solution to 
balancing diplomatic and development work within the US government. 
Towards the end of the George W. Bush administration, four options for assigning 
bureaucratic responsibilities for US foreign assistance programmes received special 
attention: 1) the creation of a cabinet-level development agency; 2) the merger of the State 
Department and USAID; 3) the reinvention of the foreign affairs bureaucracy to 
accommodate a stronger development-oriented vision; and 4) the maintenance of USAID as 
a core development agency subordinated to the State Department, albeit with strengthened 
capacities to advance its development mandate (Brainard 2008). 
Proponents of a cabinet-level development department have emphasised that US foreign 
policy is characterised by an imbalance between the use of military and civilian foreign 
policy instruments and that global development should be upgraded as a core pillar of 
foreign policy alongside defence and diplomacy. Perceived advantages of a cabinet-level 
department include the potential consolidation of development programmes located across 
government agencies, the alignment of budgetary and policy planning functions with 
implementation responsibilities and the creation of a focal point for governmental 
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coordination on development issues. The main advantage of this organisational model is 
considered to be the leadership role that the head of the department can play in introducing 
development concerns into high-level policy discussions (HELP Commission 2007; 
Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network 2008; Herrling / Radelet 2008). Even with the 
creation of a cabinet-level development department, proponents of this model recognise that 
some important streams of funding for cooperation with developing countries would not be 
included under its purview, and therefore suggest that a strengthened coordination mandate 
for development issues within the Executive Office of the President would be a necessary 
complement to this reform (Herrling / Radelet 2008; Modernizing Foreign Assistance 
Network 2008). 
The proposal to integrate USAID into the State Department can also be viewed as a means 
of elevating the civilian dimension of US foreign policy and increasing the consistency of 
policy planning and implementation. A State Department with a stronger resource base and 
broader mandate would presumably be in a better position to limit the expansion of the 
DOD’s role as an aid provider (Epstein / Weed 2009). A further justification for a merger 
reflects emerging challenges in engagement with developing countries. The problem 
complexes in fragile states suggest a need to combine responses dealing with short-term 
stabilisation and long-term reconstruction. In other contexts, the broadening of the 
development agenda to include a variety of issues and stakeholder groups would potentially 
imply a role for the State Department as a network manager (HELP Commission 2007). 
Critics of this proposal emphasise the short-term and crisis-management orientation of the 
State Department, its limited reservoir of development expertise and its tendency to take 
decisions based on political considerations, such as maintaining support from allies, as key 
arguments against consolidating foreign assistance authorities in this agency (Herrling / 
Radelet 2008; Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network 2008). 
As an attempt to offer a middle ground between the two organisational reform proposals 
outlined above, the majority of participants in the HELP Commission endorsed a proposal to 
create an International Affairs Department, which would serve as a successor to the State 
Department and likely retain its name.
38
 The central consideration guiding this proposal is 
that structural transformation would be required within the existing foreign affairs 
bureaucracy in order to elevate the status of development goals in US foreign policy, ensure 
that country-level implementation experiences inform policy planning and overcome the 
tension between the promotion of short-term political interests and long-term development 
objectives (HELP Commission 2007). The proposal highlights the value of consolidating 
responsibilities for regional cooperation and advocates safeguarding development 
competencies within the organisation by creating funding firewalls between departments 
dealing with political affairs and functional departments dealing with economic 
development issues. Its goal would be to consolidate programmes under functional 
headings, so that programmes housed in agencies apart from the State Department and 
USAID would also be folded into the new ministry. Attention to the type of training that 
personnel receive and the prospects for career development within the organisation would 
be considered necessary to shape the bureaucratic culture of the new organisation. Its 
                                                          
38  The HELP Commission was established by an act of Congress in 2004 to serve an advisory function in 
preparing proposals to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of US foreign assistance programmes. 
Its members were appointed by the Congress and the President. 
Erik Lundsgaarde 
34 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
consolidated resource base is perceived as a way of increasing the stature of civilian aspects 
of foreign policy within the executive branch (HELP Commission 2007). 
One alternative to the reassignment of authorities or the creation of new government entities 
to promote foreign policy and development goals would be the strengthening of existing 
elements of the foreign assistance system. Many analysts have indicated that USAID has, 
over time, been disempowered in its ability to promote development goals and deliver 
assistance effectively due to reductions in personnel and its growing reliance on private 
contractors, among other factors (Atwood / McPherson / Natsios 2008). Increasing the 
agency’s resources and easing the legislative restraints that it faces could serve to elevate 
USAID’s position within the government. Investing in building up the capacities of the 
primary development agency alone nevertheless would not guarantee that the diverse 
spectrum of governmental actors involved in development cooperation would align 
cooperation strategies with the approaches favoured by a reformed USAID or pursue 
coordinated action. 
While the fact that many proposals for overarching organisational reforms in the US system 
date to the transition period between the George W. Bush administration and the Obama 
presidency indicates, on the one hand, that the Obama administration has taken on board 
core recommendations such as the need to strengthen the role of civilian power in foreign 
policy, it likely also reflects the recognition among many policy analysts of the political 
difficulties in achieving a grand redesign of the foreign assistance system. 
Even in the absence of fundamental organisational reform, numerous adjustments could still 
be made within the system to limit programmatic redundancies and promote coherence 
among governmental actors providing assistance to developing countries. In this vein, 
researchers from the Center for American Progress and the Center for Global Development 
recently advanced the idea to establish an International Affairs Realignment Commission 
(Norris et al. 2012). The mandate of this commission would be to review programmes and 
projects funded through the International Affairs Budget to identify areas of duplication and 
opportunities for the consolidation or reduction of initiatives. In examining a spectrum of 
cooperation initiatives managed across government agencies, the commission would also 
assess the attribution of responsibilities to specific agencies and develop recommendations 
to improve the division of labour between them. As such, this proposal would take a 
thorough budgetary review as a starting point for a fundamental reassessment of the 
contributions of diverse agencies to development, and thus potentially gradually lead to a 
reorganisation of the system.  
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5 Conclusions and recommendations 
The proposal to create an International Affairs Realignment Commission in the United 
States to improve the efficiency of the US international cooperation system underlines the 
relevance of the key questions to guide reform efforts identified in the German case in 
other national contexts. These questions suggest that the need for adaptation in an 
international cooperation system should be assessed in relation to a set of goals or 
strategic framework, the competencies that governmental actors can contribute towards 
achieving these goals, the coordination mechanisms needed to maintain a useful division 
of labour and the resource requirements for organisations to perform the mandates they are 
attributed. 
As the review of ODA funding trends across government agencies in Germany and the 
United States indicated, the participation of diverse agencies in development cooperation 
has, on a broad level, not yet fundamentally challenged the leadership role of foreign 
affairs and development agencies in guiding cooperation programmes. This conclusion 
may be influenced by the system-wide perspective adopted in this paper, as the 
concentration of the international engagement of sector-specific ministries (e.g. the 
German Ministry of the Environment or the US Department of Health and Human 
Services) in their core fields of activity may present a more direct challenge to agencies 
for which individual sectors represent one of many areas of involvement (i.e. the BMZ 
and USAID). 
The rationale for engagement from sector-specific ministries nevertheless poses a direct 
challenge in considering development cooperation as an autonomous policy field. Sector-
specific ministries’ self-understanding of the justification for engaging in developing 
countries is that, in order to achieve domestic objectives, it is necessary to invest 
internationally. This differs from a justification for cooperation emphasising the 
promotion of welfare and economic development in partner countries as goals in their own 
right. Sector-specific ministries therefore promote mutual interests in development rather 
than defending an altruistic justification for engagement. In this respect, the role of sector-
specific ministries as aid providers creates pressure on DAC donors to transparently define 
the interests guiding cooperation programmes. The clear definition of interests and 
priorities is a foundation for developing an external relations apparatus that reflects the 
balance of goals that a given country seeks to pursue. 
Both the German and US development cooperation systems can be described as 
pluralistic, given the variety of governmental actors with an international role. This 
pluralism can be advantageous by promoting the mobilisation of additional resources, 
transferring expertise related to core competencies within domestic policy fields and 
enlarging the networks participating in the resolution of development challenges. These 
factors are referred to as potential advantages because the assessment of ministerial 
strengths often depends on self-presentation rather than on an evaluation of the 
effectiveness and value-added of cooperation programmes of diverse actors. This is true 
not only for sector-specific ministries but also for the foreign affairs and development 
agencies that remain the core players in development cooperation. 
The potentially negative side of pluralism in the governmental landscape for managing 
cooperation programmes relates to the prospect of inconsistency in governmental action. 
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Consistency among governmental actors derives from the reference to shared strategies 
that outline government priorities and assign responsibilities for achieving specific goals, 
the availability of adequate mechanisms for coordination and the harmonisation of 
business practices across governmental entities. Although the engagement of a multitude 
of actors in international cooperation is often assumed to present a coordination challenge, 
if these actors address complementary priorities and engage with different stakeholders, 
the potential for inefficiencies through splintered or duplicated efforts may be limited. 
The analysis of the distribution of funding across government agencies and the 
coordination roles performed by specific governmental actors in this paper offers a 
starting point for assessing coordination challenges within each system; however, the 
analysis of inter-ministerial interaction within specific sectors is needed to identify the 
magnitude of coordination challenges resulting from ministerial pluralism. In this context, 
it is useful to note that the distribution of responsibilities among different governmental 
actors is not the only potential source of coordination challenges: factors such as the 
underlying nature of the problem area, the institutional structures of the partner countries 
where cooperation programmes are implemented or the personalities of participants in 
policy processes may also influence coordination prospects. 
In both cases examined, the challenges of improving the consistency of government-wide 
action have been acknowledged, and mechanisms exist to promote information-sharing 
across government. These mechanisms (such as the Ressortkreis Technische 
Zusammenarbeit und ODA-Transparenz in Germany) provide a foundation for 
intensifying dialogue and coordination across government. Because coordination is 
dependent at a basic level on a mutual awareness of international activities, improving the 
transparency of programmes funded by different governmental actors represents an 
important first step in promoting cross-governmental consistency. The commitment of the 
US government to increase the scope of agency reporting on foreign assistance activities 
to comply with domestic transparency requirements and commitments to adhere to 
International Aid Transparency Initiative standards signals that the government has 
recognised the value of establishing a common information base. It is nevertheless also 
clear that translating this commitment into action requires internal reforms within a host of 
government agencies and the dedication of additional personnel resources to the tasks of 
compiling data in standard formats and communicating information about programmes to 
other agencies (Executive Office of the President 2012). 
Improving the availability of information on international programmes overseen by 
various government agencies is by itself not a guarantee that the information will be used 
to support planning efforts. In addition to examining the capacities of internationally 
active bureaucracies to generate and disseminate relevant information across government, 
individual bureaucracies also need to assess their internal capacities for uptake. This may 
relate not only to the availability of staff to manage interactions with other bureaucracies 
but also to the processes in place to facilitate information exchange within a given 
bureaucracy. The potential challenges outlined in this paper related to the division of 
responsibilities across bureaucracies may, in practice, also be replicated within individual 
agencies. 
As noted above, it will be difficult for governments to identify solutions to improve the 
consistency of international engagement among different agencies without first identifying 
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cross-governmental priorities. Germany and the United States are currently both 
experiencing a period of reflection on the reorientation of foreign policy. In Germany, this 
reflection process is linked to the demand for a strengthened global leadership role, 
whereas in the United States the challenge principally relates to rebalancing the character 
of its global engagement by reducing the military dimension and strengthening the civilian 
dimension of foreign policy. Possible organisational reforms should be based on a careful 
review of the global challenges that governments will need to address in the future and a 
consideration of the functions of various governmental actors in addressing these 
challenges. 
Although the analysis in this paper points to commonalities across the two systems with 
respect to core questions to guide reflection on the future organisation of international 
cooperation, there are also key differences in the context in which reform discussions will 
take place in Germany and the United States that suggest the need for different emphases 
moving forward. In the United States, organisational reform in development cooperation 
has received considerable attention both within government and in the broader 
development policy community over the last decade. Given the extensive problem 
analysis related to the strategic framework and organisational set-up of foreign assistance 
that has already taken place and the solutions that have already been developed in draft 
legislation, the absence of political will in the United States to advance organisational 
reforms may be a larger problem than the limited awareness of challenges related to the 
organisation of the foreign assistance system. 
In Germany, in contrast, the analysis of the challenges presented by the participation of 
diverse ministries in international cooperation and implications for managing relations 
with developing countries has been more limited. Given unfolding discussions on the 
future of German foreign policy and the content of the post-2015 sustainable development 
agenda, the current government has the opportunity to use the years ahead to define core 
foreign policy goals and the main priorities that the system of international cooperation 
will be expected to address in the future. A government-wide competence review related 
to international engagement would be a logical extension of these strategic deliberations. 
The main goal of a competence review should be to identify the strengths and limitations 
of diverse governmental actors in international cooperation.  
Questions that reflect the challenges facing different ministries should be raised within a 
competence review process. First, the role and functionality of the core development actor 
(BMZ) merits special attention. Development-focused actors are generally assumed to 
have a systemic perspective that defends the interests of partner-country beneficiaries 
based on an awareness of country-level challenges. The quality of country-specific and 
sectoral expertise, cross-sectoral competencies and coordination capabilities should be 
included in a ministerial assessment. Second, the transferability of the domestic public 
policy expertise of sectoral ministries to cooperation in varied country contexts should be 
examined. Third, in light of the perception that the participation of diverse ministries in 
international cooperation pushes the foreign affairs ministry to assume a more important 
coordination role, the competencies of the foreign affairs bureaucracy in managing cross-
sectoral policy linkages should be scrutinised. This can include the consideration of how 
thematic work areas are organised within the foreign ministry and which qualifications 
ministry personnel possess to guide cooperation programmes. A cross-governmental 
competence review could contribute to eliminating programmatic redundancies, 
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combining existing portfolios in new ways or creating new bureaucratic units in response 
to functional gaps.  
In preparation for a competence review, individual ministries should analyse their own 
strengths and limitations within the broader cooperation landscape and devote internal 
resources to reflect strategically on their future role within the German external relations 
apparatus. Within the BMZ, in particular, it is important that discussions on desirable 
priorities for international cooperation in the future are also accompanied by reflection on 
the added value of the ministry as a cooperation actor, taking into consideration the 
geographic and thematic expertise that the ministry possesses that other governmental aid 
providers might not.
39
 Such a reflection process should not only contribute to positioning 
the BMZ in discussions on the future organisation of international cooperation but also to 
outlining the knowledge and skills that the ministry believes other governmental actors 
should learn from. 
Various exercises have already been conducted within the US government in recent years 
to review management challenges in international cooperation. These initiatives (the 
Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development and the QDDR) did not conclude 
with many concrete plans to advance organisational reform efforts. Rather than investing 
additional energy in system-wide reviews in the US context, it may be more productive in 
the near term to devote focused attention to narrower areas of concern in managing the 
system. The analysis in this paper suggests that because the State Department has already 
assumed a coordination role within sectors dealing with issues such as global health or 
global energy policy, it is important to examine the competencies of the State Department 
in guiding thematic cooperation in these sectors. As in the German case, the review of 
coordination capabilities of the foreign affairs bureaucracy should examine not only the 
character of the expertise that resides within existing coordination units but also human 
resource requirements in terms of staffing levels and qualifications that enable the 
bureaucracy to provide adequate guidance and support to other governmental actors 
responsible for designing and implementing programmes. 
Even if ongoing internal reform processes within USAID increase the agency’s ability to 
shape the US agenda for engaging with developing countries, it is unlikely that it will be 
able to assume a coordination role vis-à-vis other government agencies that is comparable 
to the coordination mandate held by the State Department as the preeminent bureaucracy 
managing bilateral and multilateral relations. Similar to the BMZ, to position itself within 
future discussions on the reform of international cooperation, it is important for USAID to 
analyse its comparative advantages as an aid provider in relation to other government 
agencies and to articulate what its strengths and limitations are in terms of available 
expertise, access to networks and working methods. 
                                                          
39  At the time of writing, an internal reorganisation of the BMZ resulting from the change in government 
at the end of 2013 was still underway. It is unclear whether this reorganisation reflects the kind of 
assessment of bureaucratic comparative advantages that this paper proposes as a useful way forward. 
Future organisational reforms should clarify the functional logic of a redistribution of responsibilities 
within the organisation and consider how reforms are linked to the functions that other governmental 
actors perform within the international cooperation system.  
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For both development agencies, the internationalisation of domestic public policy fields 
provides a stimulus to reflect on their unique contributions to international cooperation 
and their future roles in foreign affairs. The adaptation pressures suggested by the 
international engagement of diverse governmental actors reflect long-standing tensions in 
the management of relations with developing countries. These tensions include finding a 
balance between the promotion of donor and partner-country interests and reconciling the 
benefits of sector-focused cooperation with the need to link interventions across sectors to 
support broad development outcomes. Although development agencies have traditionally 
been perceived to fulfil both a mediation function for interests and to offer a cross-sectoral 
perspective, these organisations also face clear limitations in influencing how other 
governmental actors manage cooperation programmes. The dynamic governmental 
context of international cooperation should motivate these agencies to clearly articulate 
not only their accumulated achievements but also their future place in managing 
cooperation alongside other governmental actors. 
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